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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") un-
veiled a new weapon in its consumer protection arsenal: the use of
section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act" or
"the Act")' to obtain injunctions against unfair and deceptive
I Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 13(b), 38 Stat. 717, as added Mar.
21, 1938, ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982))
[hereinafter FTC Act]. Section 13(b) states:
(b) Temporary restraining orders; preliminary injunctions
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, and (2)
that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission
and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court
on review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon has become final,
would be in the interest of the public-the Commisssion by any of its attorneys
designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of the United
States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing that, weighing
the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such
action would be in the public interest, and after notice to the defendant, a tempo-
rary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be granted without bond:
Provided, however, That if a complaint is not filed within such period (not exceed-
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practices.2 In these federal district court actions, the Commission
can also secure money judgments to redress consumers' injuries.
The Commission pursues these actions without any prior or subse-
quent administrative proceedings thereby allowing it to move
swiftly against targets it could not ordinarily reach through its ad-
ministrative cease and desist orders, especially those committing
"hardcore" fraud. In bringing these actions, the Commission
forgoes its traditional roles as expert administrative judge and
policymaker. It is the courts, not the Commission, which interpret
and apply the FTC Act in these actions. The Commission only
prosecutes. Section 13(b) does not clearly delimit the scope of the
Commission's new power to seek permanent injunctions. This Arti-
cle attempts to define limits that will make these actions effective
without interfering with the Commission's policymaking role.
The source of the Commission's new found injunctive muscle
is the second proviso of section 13(b).3 Congress enacted section
13(b) primarily to authorize the Commission to seek preliminary
injunctions during pending administrative cease and desist pro-
ceedings.4 However, Congress added a second proviso, which states
"[t]hat in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction."'6
This siinple one line grant authorizes the courts to fashion any
equitable remedy reasonably necessary for complete justice in light
ing 20 days) as may be specified by the court after isssuance of the temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the order or injunction shall be dis-
solved by the court and be of no further force and effect: Provided further, That
in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may
issue, a permanent injunction. Any such suit shall be brought in the district in
which such person, partnership, or corporation resides or transacts business.
Id. (emphasis in original). [References to section 13(b) actions in the remainder of this Arti-
cle refer to actions for permanent relief, not temporary relief in anticipation of administra-
tive proceedings.]
2 The first reported opinions on section 13(b) actions are found in cases filed in 1980.
See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. National
Dynamics Corp., 525 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); FTC v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp., 509
F. Supp. 51 (D. Md.), afl'd, 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981). In addition to actions aimed at
generally "unfair and deceptive" practices, the Commission is using section 13(b) permanent
injunction actions to enjoin violations of trade regulation rules and other statutes which it
enforces. E.g., United States v. JS & A Group, Inc., 716 F.2d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1983) (viola-
tion of Mail Order Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (1986)); FTC v. Virginia Homes Mfg., 509 F. Supp.
at 54 (violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
See supra note 1.
See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
I FTC Act, § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1982); see supra note 1 (text of § 13(b)).
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of the purposes of the FTC Act.' In the cases to date, the Commis-
sion has used this broad grant of authority to achieve impressive
results.' In several cases the Commission has swiftly and effectively
shut down deceptive schemes through temporary restraining or-
ders,' preliminary injunctions,9 asset freeze orders, 10 and appoint-
ments of receivers." The first actions were against companies that
sold investments, such as, oil and gas leases and related invest-
ments,'2 gemstones,' 3 and work-at-home manufacturing opera-
tions. 4 The more recent section 13(b) actions have alleged decep-
tive practices in other areas, including adoption services,' 5 home
' See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1946). See also infra notes
209-15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
8 E.g., FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Minn. 1985); FTC v.
Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., No. 84-5416 AWT (Px) (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1984) (temporary
restraining order issued ex parte July 23, 1984); FTC v. Kimberly Int'l Gem Corp., No. 83-
5268 MRP (GX) (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 15, 1983). See also Commodity Investment Fraud I:
Hearings Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 220-22 (1984) [hereinafter Fraud Hearings] (appendix
to prepared statement of Amanda Pedersen, Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, FTC).
I E.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984); FTC v. H.N.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Kitco, 612 F. Supp. at 1286. See
also Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220-22.
1* E.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 1432; FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at
1109; FTC v. Kitco, 612 F. Supp. at 1286; FTC v. R.A. Walker & Assocs., 37 Bankr. 608, 610
(D.D.C. 1983); See also Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220-22.
n E.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 1432; FTC v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., No.
84-5416 AWT (Px) (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1984) (receiver appointed Sept. 30, 1984); see
also Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220-22.
Several firms shut down or filed bankruptcy shortly after the Commission secured pre-
liminary relief. E.g., FTC v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., No. 84-5416 AWT (Px) (C.D. Cal.
filed July 23, 1984). In Alaska Land, Alaska Land Leasing went out of business and two
other defendants filed bankruptcy petitions. See In re David Kane, No. 384-31605-A-11
(N.D. Tex. filed Oct. 15, 1984); In re Federal Lease Filing Corp., No. 384-31438-A-11 (N.D.
Tex. filed Sept. 4, 1984). See also FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir.
1985) (defendant Evans Products filed for bankruptcy); FTC v. R.A. Walker & Assocs., 37
Bankr. at 610 (defendant filed for bankruptcy after Commission secured an asset freeze
order).
1" See FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), afl'g
No. 83-1702 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
" See FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 65,506, at
68,458 (N.D. Cal. 1983); FTC v. Kimberly Int'l Gem Corp., No. 83-5268 MRP (GX) (C.D.
Cal. filed Aug. 15, 1983).
14 See FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1287-90 (D. Minn. 1985).
" See FTC v. Kelley, No. 85-0736-S (D. Mass. filed Feb. 19, 1985).
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sales,'6 weight reduction plans,'17 and baldness cures.'8 The Com-
mission has secured permanent injunctions against both corpora-
tions and individuals" and has collected judgments ranging from
$65,0002o to $6,700,00021 to redress consumer injuries. These
amounts represent only a small fraction of actual consumer
losses.2 2 The Commission, like other law enforcement agencies, has
found it very difficult to recover money from the defendants run-
ning these fraudulent operations .2  The $6,700,000 judgment in
FTC v. International Diamond Corp., for example, was satisfied
primarily by the defendant's corporate insurance policies.2 4 Mean-
ingful recovery, however, is possible. In FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas
Corp.,25 the receiver collected over $12,000,000 which may be made
available for consumer redress. 26 The money already collected rep-
resents approximately twenty percent of consumers' losses.
The Commission's section 13(b) actions seeking permanent in-
16 See FTC v. R.A. Walker & Assocs., No. 83-2962 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 5 1983).
17 See United States v. Intra-Medic Formulations, Inc., No. 85-2819 (S.D. Fla. filed
Aug. 11, 1985).
,8 See id.
10 E.g., FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,725 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (permanent injunction against one corporation and four individuals); FTC v. First
Petroleum Corp., No. 82-2744 CIV-EPS (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 21, 1982) (permanent injunc-
tion against one corporation and three individuals). See also Fraud Hearings, supra note 8,
at 220-22.
20 See FTC v. Adler, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 822 (D.R.I. Dec. 4, 1986)
(stipulated final order filed).
21 See FTC v. International Diamond Corp., No. 82-0878 WAI (JSB) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4,
1982) ($6.7 million award), reported in Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220. Other redress
awards have been secured by the Commission. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Management
Corp., 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 337 (D. Mass. Feb. 13, 1987) ($1,500,000 in
redress awarded); FTC v. Trans-Alaska Energy Corp., 52 Antitrust Trade & Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 269 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1987) ($100,000); FTC v. Leland Indus., 49 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 669 (C.D. Cal. order filed Oct. 11, 1985) ($2,500,000); FTC v. Kimberly
Int'l Gem Corp., 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 439 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1985)
($280,000); FTC v. J & R Mktg. Corp., 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 881 (S.D. Fla.
May 10, 1985) ($700,000).
22 See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220-22. For example, the Commission esti-
mated that International Diamond did over $150,000,000 in business annually. Id. at 220. It
was able to settle its FTC case for $6.7 million. Id.
23 See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 140-41 (prepared statement of Richard F. Mik-
lic, Supervising U.S. Probation Officer, S.D. Fla.).
24 See FTC Review (1977-84): Report Prepared by a Member of the FTC [Michael
Pertschuk] together with Comments from Other Members of the Comm'n for the Use of
the Subcomm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
20 748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984).
20 See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 222.
27 Id. The company had $12 million in assets and went into liquidation. See id.
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junctions fill a void in law enforcement against fraud. The Com-
mission's new jurisdiction extends to any practices in or affecting
consumers,2 8 whereas other federal civil agencies which combat
fraud have narrow jurisdictional limitations. For instance, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") can only regulate
securities and related industries" and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (the "CFTC") can only regulate commodities
futures contracts and related investments.3" Most of the Federal
Trade Commission's cases to date have been outside both the
SEC's and CFTC's jurisdiction.
Through permanent injunctions, the Commission can also
reach cases beyond criminal prosecution. Although criminal prose-
cution carries the threat of much harsher penalties, criminal fraud
is very difficult to prove. Criminal prosecutors must prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the accused's actual knowledge of the false-
hood or his reckless indifference to the truth.31 The Commission
has a lower burden of proof, and, as will be developed later, should
have to prove less to secure an injunction and a monetary redress
judgment.32 Furthermore, the Commission can secure preliminary
injunctions to stop practices during the pendency of its actions.
Section 13(b) actions are a very promising consumer protec-
tion enforcement tool.33 By indirectly authorizing potentially broad
28 FTC Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
29 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77mm (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Other statutes enforced by the SEC include: Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-781U1 (1982)); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, 54
Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2o Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
1' See United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616, 623 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 942 (1974).
32 See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
23 In fiscal 1982, the Commission filed two section 13(b) enforcement actions. FTC v.
Hosiery Corp. of Am., No. 81-4237 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 28, 1982); FTC v. International
Diamond Corp., No. 82-0878 WAI (JSB) (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 4, 1982). See ANNuAL REPORT
9, 12 (1982). Since then the Commission has filed over forty such actions. FTC v. American
Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985); FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Hopkins Dodge Sales, No. 3-85-1859, slip op. (D. Minn. filed Nov. 18,
1985, decided June 15, 1987); FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 52 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 337 (D. Mass. consent decree filed Feb. 19, 1987); FTC v. Engage-A-
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remedies, though, section 13(b) leaves open many questions about
the scope of the remedy. Section 13(b) states only that the situa-
tion must be a "proper case" and that the Commission must make
"proper proof," but defines neither term.
Defining "proper cases" requires identifying those situations
in which the courts can act effectively as the decisionmaker. Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act declares illegal all unfair and deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.3 4 In applying this language,
the Commission has argued that courts can effectively act in any
case in which a "clear" violation exists. A clear violation, according
to the Commission, is any violation of either a trade regulation rule
or a statute enforced by the Commission other than the FTC Act,
Car People, Inc., No. 86-3758, slip op. (D.N.J. 1986); FTC v. Adler, 51 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 822 (D.R.I. stipulated final order filed Dec. 2, 1986); FTC v. Rare Coin
Galleries of Am., No. 86-2683-C (D. Mass. filed Sept. 16, 1986); United States v. KRSS Dev.
Corp., No. 85C-9888 (E.D. Ill. consent decree filed Sept. 10, 1986); FTC v. Solar Mich., Inc.,
No. 86-CV-40368-FL (E.D. Mich. filed Aug. 11, 1986); United States v. North Am. Office
Sys., No. CA-386185-OG (N.D. Tex. filed July 17, 1986); United States v. Rocky Mountain
Circulation, No. 86-798 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 23, 1986); FTC v. Solar Am., Inc., No. C-1-86-
0291 (S.D. Ohio filed Mar. 28, 1986); FTC v. Music Library Assoc., No. 86-1145 (C.D. Cal.
filed Feb. 21, 1986); United States v. Thermo Prods. Co., No. W-86CA007 (W.D Tex. filed
Jan. 15, 1986); FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985); United States
v. Technical Communications, Inc., No. 85-137-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. filed Dec. 20, 1985); United
States v. Walser Motors, No. 3-85-1898 (D. Minn. filed Dec. 4, 1985); FTC v. Freeway
Dodge, Inc., No. 4-85-1573 (D. Minn. filed Nov. 18, 1985); FTC v. The Cellular Corp., No.
85-8231WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 10, 1985); United States v. Allied Fin. Co., No. 3-85-
1771R (N.D. Tex. consent decree filed Sept. 30, 1985); United States v. Fidelity Acceptance
Corp., No. 3-85-1588 (D. Minn. consent decree filed Sept. 30, 1985); United States v.
Landmark Fin. Serv. Inc., 612 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1985) (consent decree filed Dec. 9,
1986); United States v. Hooker Homes, Inc., No. C85-4239A, slip op. (D. Ga. 1985) (consent
decree filed Aug. 25, 1986); United States v. Intra-Medic Formulations, Inc., No. 85-2819
(S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 11, 1985); United States v. Royco Auto. Parts, Inc., No. 83-1208-CIV-J-
12, slip op. (M.D. Fla. July 17, 1985); United States v. C.D. Control Technology, No. CV-
8502437 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 1985); United States v. Nash/Phillips Copus, Inc., No. 85-
2038 (W.D. Tex. consent decree filed June 24, 1985); FTC v. Kaplan, No. LV 85161 (D. Nev.
filed Mar. 6, 1985); FTC v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., No. 85-0976 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 26,
1985); FTC v. Kelley, No. 85-0736-5 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 19, 1985); FTC v. Furman, No. 84-
0803-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985); FTC v. Jones, No. 85-0189 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 9,
1985); United States v. Sheldon Friedlich Mktg., No. 85-130 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 7, 1985);
FTC v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., No. 84-5416 AWT (Px) (C.D. Cal. July 23, 1984); FTC v.
Trans-Alaska Energy Corp., 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 269 (C.D. Cal. filed
Mar. 27, 1984); FTC v. Kimberly Int'l Gem Corp., 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
439 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 15, 1983); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., No. 83-3589 CIV-WMH,
slip op. (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Leland
Indus., No. 83-3589 CBM (Px) (C.D. Cal. filed June 3, 1983); FTC v. J & R Mktg. Corp., 48
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 881 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1983); FTC v. First Petroleum
Corp. of Am., No. 82-2744 CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 21, 1982).
34 FTC Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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as well as any practice previously declared unfair or deceptive by
the Commission in an administrative adjudication. 5
The clear violation standard, however, does not work well be-
cause courts cannot rely on the Commission's adjudicative deci-
sions. In non-rule violation cases, the Commission has always re-
lied on its congressional mantle of administrative expertise to
define the meaning of unfair and deceptive practices.36 Because the
Commission's decisions are based on their own expertise, they give
courts no guidance beyond the specific practices declared illegal.
The section 13(b) cases to date indicate that courts do not rely on
Commission precedents, but decide for themselves whether prac-
tices are unfair or deceptive. These cases also indicate that courts
do not interpret section 5 of the FTC Act consistently with either
the Commission or each other.
These inconsistent interpretations of section 5 threaten the
Commission's policymaking role. The Commission has used the
broad "unfair and deceptive practice" language of section 5 to de-
fine and redefine the limits of fair business practices. In doing so,
the Commission has often declared certain practices illegal which
had previously been considered proper.3 7 Extensive judicial inter-
pretations of section 5 may create conflicting lines of authority on
the meaning of section 5 unfairness and deception that may inhibit
the Commission's ability to maintain the flexible meaning of sec-
tion 5.38
In addition, courts have awarded redress judgments and have
issued injunctions enforceable through criminal contempt proceed-
ings to enforce their judgments. The Commission generally can en-
force its rulings only through cease and desist orders. These orders
cannot impose liability for a past violation of section 5 and are
only enforceable through civil penalty proceedings. The stronger
" See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text (discussing development of the prior
substantiation doctrine).
11 The concerns here are similar to the policies behind the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion; that when an agency and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a private claim,
the agency should use its expertise to interpret its statute before the courts do. See gener-
ally 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 22:1-22:11, at 81-121 (2d ed. 1983). The
purpose of primary jurisdiction is to allow uniformity in the regulatory scheme and to allow
expert regulators to resolve technical questions within their area of expertise. Id. Similarly,
the concern here is to circumscribe judicial interpretation of the administrative standard,
section 5, to permit the Commission to maintain a consistent, single interpretation of that
standard. See id.
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judicial remedies may not be necessary or appropriate against
some unfairness and deception. Often, it is very difficult to tell
whether the complained of practices are harmful, or whether they
are actually the fair result of a properly operating market.3 9 Con-
gress authorized the Commission to make these close decisions.
The generalist courts, in attempting to decide close cases, may ac-
tually harm consumers by inhibiting efficient, competitive business
practices.
Thus, section 13(b) actions should be formally limited to a
particularized set of proper cases that the courts are competent to
consider. This Article identifies those situations in which the
courts should be competent to find practices illegal under section
5. The Article then proposes a workable legal standard that encom-
passes these proper cases without including cases for which Com-
mission proceedings would be more appropriate. In order to find a
given situation to be a proper case, the Commission should have to
establish either a trade regulation rule violation, violation of a stat-
ute other than the FTC Act, or a misrepresentation of material
fact. This standard is superior to the Commission's clear violation
standard because it shifts the court's focus away.from the unfair or
deceptive language of section 5 to a standard courts are familiar
with and competent to handle, thereby eliminating potentially con-
flicting judicial interpretations of section 5. The proposed standard
would provide the same relief actually secured by the Commission
in recent cases, but would avoid judicial interpretations of section
5 that are inconsistent with each other and with the Commission's
interpretations.
This Article will then address the proper proof that the Com-
mission should have to establish in order to secure injunctions and
redress awards, as well as the proper measure of recovery for re-
dress awards. Since prospective injunctions have the same correc-
tive effect as cease and desist orders, courts should issue injunc-
tions in any proper case. The overriding goal for redress awards
should be deterrence.40 Courts should adopt standards for the
proper proof and the measure of recovery that provide for maxi-
mum deterrent effect. This Article evaluates the extent to which
the courts are currently adopting standards that will provide deter-
rence and concludes that in order to provide meaningful deter-
3 See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
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rence, the Commission should be authorized to seek civil penalties,
in addition to equitable redress, against truly fraudulent actors.
II. BACKGROUND
The heart of the Commission's consumer protection law is sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act. Section 5 declares illegal, "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.""' Congress drafted
section 5 as the centerpiece of an administrative enforcement sys-
tem designed to identify potentially harmful practices and to stop
them in their incipiency. The Commission's goal was to correct un-
lawful practices, not to punish wrongdoers. However, in the 1970's,
Congress wanted more. It wanted the Commission to deter dishon-
est practices. In doing so, Congress wanted to maintain a flexible
administrative standard. Deterrence, however, requires a relatively
fixed standard that will give wrongdoers notice that their contem-
plated acts will violate the law. Congress resolved the conflict be-
tween flexibility and deterrence in many of the reforms of the
1970's. With section 13(b), however, Congress cryptically limited
actions to "proper cases," with no further guidance.
A. The Desire for an Expert Commission
1. The 1914 Act
Congress originally adopted the administrative enforcement of
laws against unfair business practices because of the failures it saw
in the judicial enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act.42 The
Sherman Act prohibited "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."43
The Supreme Court adopted a "Rule of Reason," which held that
not all restraints of trade were prohibited, but only unreasonable
ones.4 4 In 1911, the Cummins Report criticized the Rule of Reason
as vague and uncertain and charged the Court with garnering legis-
" FTC Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982). The applicability of section 13(b) actions
to unfair methods of competition is beyond the scope of this Article.
42 See Act of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act), ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1982)).
43 Id. § 1.
4 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). For a detailed legislative history of the 1914 FTC Act, see
G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE (1924); 5 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES (1982).
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lative authority to itself.4 5 The legitimacy of a business practice
now turned on "the economic standard which the individual mem-
bers of the court may happen to approve. '46 The report concluded
that such vague standards created only uncertainty and judicial
delay,47 and recommended the establishment of an expert adminis-
trative body to aid in trade law enforcement.48
In 1914, all three major political parties called for the estab-
lishment of an expert, administrative trade commission 9 to effec-
tively regulate unfair trade practices.50 Over time, it was expected
that this expert body would build up a coherent body of trade law
that would "be accepted and will constitute our code of business
morals." 51
The Commission was created by Congress and section 5 of the
1914 Act declared "unfair methods of competition" illegal, and
gave the Commission the authority to issue orders to cease and
desist such practices.2 The conference report stated that an expert
11 S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 10-11 (1913) [hereinafter Cummins Report].
The Cummins Report also criticized Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898), and
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894), for requiring the government to show
"direct" interference with commerce before establishing a Sherman Act violation. The re-
port claimed courts were not competent to make such decisions:
It is obvious that the opinion of any given man in any given case upon this ques-
tion, whether he be judge or not, must depend largely, not upon his learning in the
law but upon his training and bent in the economy of commerce. The result has
been, and necessarily will be, that the law officer of the Government before he
institutes a prosecution must determine whether the restraint is direct and imme-
diate, and the court in order to decide the issue must employ the functions of the
legislator rather than lawyer.
Cummins Report, supra, at 5.
" Id. at 10.
" Id. at 12-13.
Id.
The 1912 Republican and Progressive platforms both called for establishment of a
trade commission. H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2 (1914) (minority re-
port). President Wilson also called for a trade commission. Address by President Woodrow
Wilson Before a Joint Session of Congress on Additional Legislation for the Control of
Trusts and Monopolies, H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (Jan. 20, 1914), reprinted
in 51 CONG. REC. 1962-64, 1978-79 (1914).
80 See Cummins Report, supra note 45, at 18-23 (separate statement of Sen.
Newlands).
51 51 CONG. REC. 11,083 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands). See S. REP. No. 597, app.,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1914).
52 FTC Act, § 5(b), 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982)).
Commission orders to enforce this general standard proscribed future conduct only; they did
not impose penalties or liability for past acts, and initially the orders were not even self-
enforcing. Id. The sponsors of the bill did not favor penalties for prior conduct. Senator
Newlands described the Commission's role as "instuctive rather than punitive, helpful
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commission with such powers could isolate potentially harmful
practices and stop them before they grew. 53 The Act intentionally
omitted a definition of "unfair methods of competition," leaving it
to the Commission to define. The Senate Committee report stated
that it would be futile to attempt to list specific methods of unfair
competition "after writing 20 of them into the law it would be
quite possible to invent others. ' 54 The conference report added
that no one definition could cover every situation, stating that
"[w]hether competition is unfair or not generally depends upon the
surrounding circumstances of the particular case."'5 5 Congress
wanted an expert commission to make those detailed judgments in
particular cases.
Congress thus created an expert Commission that would cor-
rect business practices harmful to the public interest. The Com-
mission would test business practices against the flexible standard
of "unfair methods of competition." The Commission would not
punish, but would only correct. In the process, the Commission
would evolve standards for business practices that could change
and grow with the times.
2. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938
The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938 echoed the goal of the
Act's original authors, to have an expert body apply a general stan-
dard in order to correct business practices. The Wheeler-Lea
Amendment of 1938 added "unfair and deceptive acts and prac-
rather than prejudicial." Representative Stevens, a member of the conference committee,
later added that the Commission would "help by information, encouragement, admonition,
advice, and, if necessary, restraint." 51 CONG. REC. 14,937 (1914).
Penalties were later added to this legislative scheme. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 5(l),
52 Stat. 111, 114 [hereinafter Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938]. This amendment added
civil penalties of up to $5,000 for violating cease and desist orders. The Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. II, 87 Stat. 576, 591 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(l) (1982)) [hereinafter 1973 FTC Amendments], increased the maximum civil
penalty to $10,000.
11 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
The most certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent unfair com-
petition. This can be best accomplished through the action of an administrative
body of practical men thoroughly informed in regard to business, who will be able
to apply the rule enacted by Congress to particular business situations so as to
eradicate evils with the least risk of interfering with legitmate business operations.
Id.
S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
11 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914).
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tices" as section 5 violations. 8 Congress added this language to
overturn a restrictive Supreme Court interpretation." Throughout
the 1920's the Commission had repeatedly found deceptive adver-
tising to be an unfair method of competition." In 1931, the Su-
preme Court interpreted unfair methods of competition to mean
that the Commission could restrain only those practices that in-
jured competitors."9 The Commission had to prove injury to com-
petitors to establish a violation. If no competitors were injured,
even fraud would not violate the Act. Congress added the language
"unfair or deceptive acts and practices" to remove this evidentiary
burden.0e As with the 1914 Act, Congress made no attempt to de-
fine the newly declared illegal unfair and deceptive acts or prac-
tices. Congress intended that the Commission have the same flexi-
bility in interpreting unfair and deceptive acts or practices as it
did in interpreting unfair methods of competition. Senator
Wheeler stated, "[t]his legislation is designed to give the Federal
Trade Commission jurisdiction over unfair acts and practices for
consumer protection to the same extent that it now has jurisdic-
tion over unfair methods of competition for the protection of
competitors."'"
The amendment's sponsors also rejected attempts to punish
businessmen for past acts as evidenced by the Senate report which
described the Commission's authority as "preventive and coopera-
tive rather than penal." 2 Representative Lea stated in floor de-
ll Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, § 3, 52 Stat. at 111-12 (amending FTC Act, §
5(a)). For a detailed legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, see 6 E. KINTNER,
supra note 44, at 4807-4946 (1983).
57 See Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Adver-
tising, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 534-35 (1931).
68 See, e.g., FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922) (misrepresentation
and misdescription are unfair methods of competition)
1 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); see Handler, supra note 57 (analysis of
Raladam's limitation of FTC jurisdicton).
10 See Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade
Commission, 1981 WXis. L. REV. 107, 111-12 [hereinafter Craswell, Unfair Acts].
After the amendment, section 5 read, "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-12. In 1975, the "in com-
merce" language was changed to "in or affecting commerce." Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, § 201, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982)) [hereinafter FTC Improvement Act of
1975].
61 83 CONG. REc. 3256 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler). See Craswell, Unfair Acts,
supra note 60, at 111-12.
62 S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). A separate part of the Wheeler-Lea
1987]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
bates that all the Commission had to do was to point out improper
practices and businesses would correct them:
The great majority of people who advertise want to do the right
thing, and if the Government points out to them where they are
making a mistake and are in violation of the law, they are willing
to conform to the law. The man with good intentions should not
be penalized before he has had a chance to correct his mistake."3
In both the 1914 Act and the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of
1938, Congress wanted an expert Commission that would correct
business practices harmful to the public interest without imposing
liability for past acts or providing remedies for private injury. The
Commission would point the way and businessmen would follow.
3. The Commission as Congress' Experts
The Commission has acted as Congress' independent body of
business experts since 1914. It has used the broad language of sec-
tion 5 to fashion and refashion its concept of the parameters of fair
and honest business practices. The Commission has developed sep-
arate standards for commercial deception and unfairness. 4 A num-
ber of guides have been published by the Commission stating its
opinion on how businesses in particular industries should oper-
Amendment gave the Commission extensive authority to stop false advertising of food and
drugs, including authority to seek preliminary injunctions in anticipation of administrative
proceedings, and, in some cases, to seek criminal penalties. See Wheeler-Lea Amendment of
1938, ch. 49, §§ 12(a)-14(a), 52 Stat. at 114-15. See generally 6 E. KiNrrmR, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW § 43.17 (1986). The conference committee considered giving the Commission
similar authority for all section 5 violations, but rejected that as too severe. Senator Wheeler
stated that extending the penalties:
would bring down on our heads every businessman in the United States, who
would probably say to us, "what are you going to do? You are not going to give us
a chance. You are going to make it possible for someone to get an injunction
against us. You are going to enable one to file a complaint charging us with a
criminal offense and you should not do that."
83 CONG. REc. 3293 (Mar. 14, 1938) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler).
e 83 CONG. REc. 392 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Lea).
For a historical perspective on how the Commission's unfairness and deception stan-
dards have evolved over time, compare the following commentators' analyses of section 5:
Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 70 GEo. L.J. 225, 239-67 (1981); Craswell, Unfair Acts, supra note 60, at
111-13; Fraser, The Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Against Deceptive Advertis-
ing, 1985 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 537; Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Ad-
vertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 457-92 (1964); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protec-
tion and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REv. 661, 675-92 (1977); Note,
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1038-62 (1967).
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ate. 5 The Commission has also issued advisory opinions on the ap-
propriateness of proposed practices. 6 In the mid-1960's, the Com-
mission began promulgating trade regulation rules which had the
force of law, and which precisely prescribed proper practices for
entire industries.6 The Commission could revise standards for
business practices because it alone decided what was unfair or de-
ceptive under section 5. In the words of the Supreme Court, the
Commission, "like a court of equity," measured "a practice against
the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness."68
The Commission was able to maintain flexibility in its stan-
dards because it enforced its decisions, including its trade regula-
tion rules, through cease and desist orders. 9 The order only pro-
" See 16 C.F.R. §§ 228-59 (1987).
See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 61 (1983).
17 The Commission developed rulemaking in the 1960's based on FTC Act, § 6(g), 38
Stat. at 722 (Commission shall make "rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out
...this Act") (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1982)). See National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974);
Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN.
L. REv. 383, 455-61 (1964); Baum & Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance and the
Federal Trade Commission, 38 IND. L.J. 322, 351-45 (1963). The FTC Improvement Act of
1975 specifically authorized trade regulation rules. See FTC Improvements Act of 1975, §
202 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). See generally
Kintner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Con-
sumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 669-79 (1975); Note, The Federal Trade
Commission Today: The New Improved Improvements Act, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 849,
851-53 (1976); Note, Administrative Law-Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act-The FTC Can Obtain Equitable Relief for Deceptive Trade
Practices, 53 TEx. L. REv. 831, 831-32 (1975).
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
FTC Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982). Section 5(b) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, part-
nership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or
unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear
to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the in-
terest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or
corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice
of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the
service of said complaint.... If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the
opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is pro-
hibited by this subchapter, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state
its findings as to the facts and shall issue and cause to be served on such person,
partnership, or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or corpo-
ration to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or
practice.
Id.
Cease and desist orders were the only enforcement tool in the original FTC Act. The
Commission later developed rulemaking based on section 6(g) of the FTC Act. See supra
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scribed future conduct; the cease and desist orders imposed no
liability for past acts and provided no remedy for consumers in-
jured by the unfair or deceptive practices."0 Thus, courts could de-
fer to the Commission when it declared illegal a practice previously
considered proper because the ruling threatened no unfair surprise.
The order only had a prospective, corrective effect. As many have
said, the order in effect said, "go and sin no more."'71
note 67. It was not until the passage of FTC amendments attached to the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. II, 87 Stat. 576 (1973), and the FTC Improve-
ment Act of 1975, supra note 60, that the Commission gained the authority to seek addi-
tional tools to remedy past wrongs. See FTC Act, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982 & Supp. III
1985) (1975 Improvement Act specifically authorized trade regulation rules); infra notes 73-
95 and accompanying text. See generally Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's In-
junctive Powers Under the Alaskan Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV.
872 (1975) (discussing legislative history of Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act of 1973); Kintner &
Smith, supra note 67, at 665-88 (discussing history and effect of Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act
of 1973 and 1975 Improvement Act).
70 The Commission in the 1970's attempted to expand its cease and desist orders by
requiring respondents in certain cases to make restitution to injured customers, to publish
advertising correcting previous deceptive advertising, and, in some cases, to confess in the
advertising that their previous advertisements were deceptive. Corrective advertising has
been upheld, but other sanctions designed to remedy past wrongs have not. See, e.g.,
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978) (upholding corrective advertising, but striking confessional statement); Heater v.
FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1974) (overturning restitution order). See also Pitofsky,
supra note 64, at 692-701; Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Ap-
proach, 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349, 351-66 (1973); Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue
Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 496, 502-05, 513-25 (1972) [hereinafter
Note, The Limits of FTC Power]; Note, Corrective Advertising, 85 HARV. L. REv. 477 (1971)
[hereinafter Note, Corrective Advertising]. In his dissenting opinion in FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421 (1920), Justice Brandeis stated:
The [cease and desist] proceeding is not punitive. The complaint is not made with
a view to subjecting the respondents to any form of punishment. It is not reme-
dial. The complaint is not filed with a view to affording compensation for any
injury alleged to have resulted from the matter charged, . . . The proceeding is
strictly a preventive measure taken in the interest of the general public.
Id. at 432 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But see Sebert, Obtaining Monetary Redress for Con-
sumers Through Action by the Federal Trade Commission, 57 MINN. L. REV. 225, 228 (1972)
(FTC may have power to grant refunds to individuals "who incurred losses as the result of
the very actions that led to issuance of the cease and desist order").
The Commission no longer seeks redress in litigated cease and desist proceedings, but
still obtains redress awards as a part of consent decrees. See, e.g., Charles Weller, 104 F.T.C.
1089, 1095 (1984) ($60,000 paid for consumer redress).
7' Many commentators have criticized cease and desist orders for being mere "slaps on
the wrist." See REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
62-63 (1969) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER
REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 90 (1969) [hereinafter NADER REPORT]; Pitof-
sky, supra note 64, at 692-93; see also infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. One com-
mentator, quoting former FTC Chairman Dixon, further criticized cease and desist orders
because they affected only one company in the industry, leaving the rest free to continue
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Congress, dissatisfied with the limited nature of cease and de-
sist orders, amended the FTC Act in 1974 and 1975 to give the
Commission stronger enforcement powers. Congress still wanted
the Commission to evolve business standards, 2 but Congress now
wanted the Commission to deter wrongdoing and punish wrongdo-
ers, rather than just correct erring merchants.
B. Congress' Call for Deterrence
The impetus for the 1974 and 1975 amendments to the FTC
Act was the great condemnation of the Commission in the late
1960's. In separate, scathing reports, the American Bar Association
and Ralph Nader's "Raiders" condemned the Commission for in-
competence, mismanagement, inaction, and ineffective enforce-
ment of the FTC Act. 3 The reports rejected the proposition that
"all the Commission need do is point the way." They wanted
stronger enforcement tools. Both reports criticized the limited ef-
fect of Commission cease and desist orders. The administrative
proceedings took too long;74 often the respondent had voluntarily
deceptive practices. See Note, supra note 64, at 1083 & n.162. Section 13(b) actions may
provide a stronger remedy than a "slap on the wrist," but they still only isolate one or a few
members of an industry for enforcement.
72 A large portion of the 1975 amendments specifically authorized the Commission to
define the meaning of "unfair and deceptive" through state regulation rules. See FTC Im-
provement Act of 1975, supra note 60.
73 ABA REPORT, supra note 71, at 36-54; NADER REPORT, supra note 71, at 39-95.
74 Complaints about delays date back to the 1920's. See G. HENDERSON, supra note 44,
at 86. The 1969 ABA Report on the Commission provided detailed statistics of delay. ABA
REPORT, supra note 71, at 29-31. For other commentators discussing Commission delay, see
Pitofsky, supra note 64, at 692-94; Note, The Limits of FTC Power, supra note 70, at 498-
501; Note, Corrective Advertising, supra note 70, at 481-84. See also Baum & Baker, supra
note 67, at 367-75; Weston, Deceptive Advertising in the Federal Trade Commission: De-
cline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 561-63 (1964) (Commission has used temporary
cease and desist orders to cut down on delay); Note, The Federal Trade Commission and
Reform of the Administrative Process, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 671, 685-700 (1962).
The classic case of delay in FTC proceedings is Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d
461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). It took the Commission sixteen years to
force Carter Products to drop "Liver" from the name of its Little Pills. See Weston, supra,
at 561; Note, Corrective Advertising, supra note 70, at 483.
Cases extending beyond a decade have not left the Commission. The Commission took
ten years to issue cease and desist orders in the Analgesic cases. The appeals took another
year. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), afl'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d
1146 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1984); American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C.
136 (1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). The Amrep case took ten years from com-
plaint to affirmance by the circuit court of appeals. See Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362
(1983), aff'd, 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1167 (1986).
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changed practices long before the order issued; during the pen-
dency of these proceedings respondents could continue the objec-
tionable practices, thus having every incentive to delay proceedings
as long as possible; and the orders, once issued, only prohibited
future conduct without imposing any criminal or civil liability for
past acts, and without providing any remedy for consumers injured
by those acts.75 Both reports urged Commission authorization to
seek injunctions to stop practices during the pendency of Commis-
sion proceedings and to secure remedies for consumers injured by
past acts.
In 1971, Senators Magnuson and Moss proposed Senate Bill
S. 986,76 the forerunner of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty, Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975. In this bill, the au-
thors sought to give the Commission power to deter section 5 viola-
tions, not just to correct them. The authors also sought to enable
the Commission to stop violations more quickly and to secure com-
pensation for consumers injured by unfair and deceptive practices.
The bill would have authorized the Commission to seek civil penal-
ties against those knowingly committing unfair or deceptive prac-
tices," and would have permitted the Commission, after issuing a
cease and desist order against any unfair or deceptive practice, to
seek monetary redress on behalf of consumers."
The report accompanying S. 986 condemned the Commission's
cease and desist orders as wholly inadequate since the orders did
not deter unlawful practices because businessmen faced no liability
for those past acts.7 9 The only way to secure adequate deterrence,
according to the report, was to impose sanctions for the first bad
act, the one committed before the Commission acted. 0 Even the
consumer redress provisions were designed to deter future viola-
tions. The report stated that:
[t]he Committee's intent in giving these remedial powers was (1)
to reinforce the Commission's credibility in policing the market-
place by authorizing sanctions which could realistically be ex-
pected to inhibit unlawful business practices and (2) to enable the
75 ABA REPORT, supra note 71, at 62-64; NADER REPORT, supra note 71, at 90-95, 167-
73.
76 S. 986, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
77 Id. § 202.
76 Id. § 203.
11 S. REP. No. 269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1971).
80 Id. at 4-5.
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Commission, where its investigation of an act or practice revealed
damage to consumers, to utilize the results of that investigation
for the benefit of the damaged parties."'
Opponents of the bill challenged the wisdom of imposing lia-
bility on businesses for acts committed before the Commission had
divined whether those acts were unfair or deceptive."2 Permitting
the Commission to use such a flexible standard to impose liability
for past acts created a serious risk of unfair surprise. Senator Cook
argued that the Commission often "breaks new ground" and finds
conduct previously considered proper to be unfair and deceptive.8 3
Senator Cook feared that the proposal would create "a risk of po-
tentially ruinous retroactive liability if the FTC breaks new ground
in a cease and desist proceeding and finds that a course of conduct
is 'unfair or deceptive' when it previously had been generally
thought to be proper. ' 's4 He also argued that reviewing courts
would not sustain novel cease and desist orders because of the po-
tential for retroactive liability, and stated "[t]he Commission may
be hamstrung in expanding the list of unfair and deceptive prac-
tices." He concluded that the Commission's flexibility to "break
new ground" was desirable and could only be maintained by limit-
ing it to prospective relief.8 5
The Improvement Act that ultimately passed in 19756 tried to
respond to Senator Cook's concerns. Congress attempted to deter
truly bad actors without creating the threat of unfair surprise and
without limiting the Commission's ability to control the meaning
of the terms "unfair" or "deceptive." Congress did so by limiting
the new remedies to situations where the Commission had, in some
manner, already decided whether the acts violate section 5, and by
adding intent requirements. Section 5(m) authorized the Commis-
sion to seek civil penalties against: (1) rule violations done "with
actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objec-
tive circumstances" that the acts violated the rule; and (2) prac-
tices which the Commission previously declared unfair and decep-
8, Id. at 24.
82 117 CONG. REC. 39,854-55 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Cook). See generally id. at 39,856
(remarks of Sen. Hruska); id. at 39,846 (remarks of Sen. Buckley).
11 Id. at 39,854-55 (remarks of Sen. Cook).
84 Id.
OF Id.
8' Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
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tive in a cease and desist proceeding, and, which were done with
actual knowledge that the acts were unfair or deceptive." Simi-
larly, section 19 authorized the Commission to seek monetary re-
dress for consumers after the Commission issued cease and desist
orders against: (1) any rule violation; or (2) any unfair and decep-
tive practices which a reasonable person would have known were
dishonest or fraudulent.8 Section 19 also prohibited exemplary or
punitive damages. 9
C. The Lack of Congressional Guidance on Section 13(b)
Section 13(b) started as part of the bill that was the forerun-
ner to the 1975 Improvement Act. The original 1971 proposal au-
thorized the Commission only to seek temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions against entities committing or about
to commit unfair or deceptive practices.90 The preliminary injunc-
tion would dissolve in twenty days unless the Commission insti-
tuted administrative proceedings against the entities subject to the
injunction. If so commenced, the injunction would remain in force
until the Commission completed the administrative proceedings.
The bill contained no authority to seek permanent injunctions.
When reintroduced in 1973, the bill, now numbered S. 356, again
contained no authority for permanent injunctions.91 When S. 356
came out of committee, the proposed section 13(b) contained the
additional proviso, "[p]rovided further that in proper cases the
Commission may seek, and, after proper proof, the court may issue
a permanent injunction." 2
In July, 1973, within days after S. 356 was voted out of com-
mittee in the Senate, Senators Jackson and Magnuson essentially
lifted the injunction provision from S. 356 and included it as part
of an amendment to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act.9 3 This amend-
ment, unlike S. 356, authorized the Commission to seek injunctions
against violations of any statute enforced by the Commission, not
FTC Act, § 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1982).
88 FTC Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (1982).
8 Id. Section 19 also stated that its remedies did not limit remedies under any other
section of the FTC Act. FTC Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (1982).
'o S. 986, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1971).
9' S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 210 (1973), reported in S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
92 Id.
0' 1973 FTC Amendments, § 408, 87 Stat. 598 (amending FTC Act, §§ 5(1), 6 and 13;
and adding § 5(m)).
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just against unfair or deceptive practices. Facing the emergency
created by the Arab oil embargo, Congress passed the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Act with the FTC amendments intact.94
Unlike sections 19 and 5(m), Congress did not carefully limit
section 13(b)'s application to avoid judicial decisions that might
cause unfair surprise or limit the Commission's control of the
meaning of unfair and deceptive practices. Neither the statute's
"proper case" and "proper proof" language, nor the section's legis-
lative history place any meaningful limits on section 13(b).9 5 Yet,
some limitations on 13(b) actions were necessary. Congress still
wanted the Commission to develop Senator Newlands' body of
trade law; the goal of deterrence was in addition to, not in place of,
the goals of the 1914 and 1938 Acts. That is why Congress so care-
fully circumscribed the scope of sections 19 and 5(m). The scope of
9' See 6 E. KINTNER, supra note 44, at 4951-52.
91 The sparse legislative history on section 13(b) reveals little about the scope of the
Commission's permanent injunction authority. The Senate Report accompanying S. 356
gives the only significant legislative history of this clause.
Provision is also made in section [13(b)] hearing, for a court to grant a permanent
injunction. This will allow the Commision to seek a permanent injuntion when a
court is reluctant to grant a temporary injunction because it cannot be assured of
a [sic] early hearing on the merits. Since a permanent injunction could only be
granted after such a hearing, this will assure the court of the ability to set a defi-
nite hearing date. Furthermore, the Commission will have the ability, in the rou-
tine fraud case, to merely seek a permanent injunction in those situations in which
it does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act through the issuance of a cease-and-desist order. Commission re-
sources will be better utilized, and cases can be disposed of more efficiently.
S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1973).
This paragraph implies that the Committee added the second proviso to address con-
cerns that courts might refuse to issue preliminary relief that could last indefinitely, partic-
ularly when they would have no way of forcing a hearing on the merits. Rather than grant-
ing the Commission a separate weapon against unfair and deceptive practices, the proviso
gives the courts a tool to force the Commission to complete its proceedings; if the Commis-
sion takes too long, the court can take over the entire proceeding by ordering a hearing on
the merits.
The reference to "routine fraud" later in the paragraph, though, authorizes the Com-
mission to seek permanent injunctions in a certain class of cases. The reference, however, is
ambiguous at best. The sentence discussing "routine fraud" seems to equate "routine fraud"
with "those situations in which it does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of
the FTC Act." A proper case would then be any case in which the Commission had previ-
ously determined that the complained of acts violated section 5. Fraud, however, generally
requires proof of intent, reliance, and injury; elements not required for proof of unfair or
deceptive acts. See IV. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 107-10, at 740-70 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; 1
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 3.1, at 228-32 (1978). See infra notes 227-35 and
accompanying text. Thus, the "routine fraud" reference gives little guidance as to the scope
of the proper cases. The legislative history is silent regarding proper proof.
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section 13(b) actions must be similarly limited. Section 13(b) ac-
tions should not interfere with the Commission's ability to inter-
pret the meaning of section 5. Section 13(b) actions, though,
should reach the truly bad actor that Congress sought to deter.
The next section seeks to define limits for section 13(b) actions
that will strike an effective balance between these goals.
III. THE PROPER CASE
A. Economics of Advertising
Economists and legal scholars have identified several market
factors that should generally induce sellers not to deceive consum-
ers; theoretically, these factors should protect consumers from sig-
nificant injury.96 This theory also identifies certain conditions that
could result in unfair or deceptive practices. 97 By breaking down
the causes of harmful practices in the market, the theory isolates
those market conditions in which section 13(b) actions should be
effective. These isolated market conditions in which section 13(b)
actions would be effective can thus be used to develop the appro-
priate legal standard for the proper case.
This economic theory divides goods and services into three
types: those for which consumers can readily discern their quality
before purchasing them, called search goods (e.g., clothing);98 those
for which consumers can discern their quality only after purchas-
ing them and using them, called experience goods (e.g., canned
food);99 and those for which consumers can never readily discern
their quality, even after purchasing and using them, called
credence goods (e.g., automobile repair services).'
"6 See R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 4-8 (1973) [hereinafter R.
POSNER, FTC REGULATION]; Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67, 77-83 (1973); Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the
Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 530-31 (1979); Nelson, Advertising as Infor-
mation, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974) [hereinafter Nelson, Advertising]; Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) [hereinafter Nelson, Information];
Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 62-63 (1969).
11 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J. L. & ECON. 491, 501-13 (1981); Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L.
REV. 657, 722-25 (1985); Nelson, Information, supra note 96, at 315-17. See also Pitofsky,
supra note 64, at 663 (impossible for consumers to have perfect information because there
are "too many sellers offering too many products with a wide variety of characteristics").
98 See Nelson, Information, supra note 96, at 312.
9 Id.
10 See Darby & Karni, supra note 96, at 68-69.
[Vol. 61:503
FTC PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
Sellers should have very little incentive to deceive consumers
about search goods because consumers can discover the deception
before the purchase. 10 1 Sellers could deceive consumers into
purchasing experience goods the first time, but not the second.
Thus, to the extent sellers rely on repeat business, they have no
incentive to deceive consumers. Furthermore, consumers may gain
information from the experience of others to reduce the possibility
of injury even on the first purchase.1 0 2 Intensive brand advertising
of experience goods protects consumers further.10 3 The brands with
the best quality for the price will have the greatest incentive to
invest in advertising to develop the reputation of that brand. This
is so because they should gain the greatest amount of repeat sales
for each advertising dollar. Once they have developed their reputa-
tion, these producers will also have the incentive to maintain that
reputation through the quality of the product. Thus, name brands
further protect consumers by providing a meaningful indicia of the
quality of experience goods.
Credence goods present a threat of deception because consum-
ers cannot easily discern the quality of the goods purchased. 10
Sellers could make several sales to consumers before the deception
is discovered. Even in these cases, producers will have incentives
not to deceive, but to provide the highest quality goods and ser-
vices for the price.0 5 High quality producers will build up a repu-
tation as some consumers discern the quality of their goods. They
should be able to charge a premium for this reputation. Since they
can charge this premium, high quality firms should be most profit-
able. This competitive incentive should induce producers to in-
crease profitability by increasing quality, not by deceiving
consumers.10 6
101 See Nelson, Advertising, supra note 96, at 750.
102 See Nelson, Information, supra note 96, at 321-23; Posner, supra note 96, at 62-63.
103 See Nelson, Advertising, supra note 96, at 732-33, 749-51.
104 See Darby & Karni, supra note 96, at 68-70.
10I See id. at 77-83.
106 Some proponents of this analysis argue that the Commission's consumer protection
activities are largely unnecessary and probably harmful to consumers. Commission policies,
developed either through cease and desist orders or rules, generally forced sellers to provide
either additional information or a different mix of goods and services than the market indi-
cated that consumers wanted. These additional goods, services, and information raised the
costs to sellers and consumers. The benefits to consumers from additional information,
goods, or services do not outweigh these costs because, according to this view, if they had,
the market would have already provided it. See Darby & Karni, supra note 96, at 83-87;
Posner, supra note 96, at 63-68. However, this argument ignores the fact that markets do
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B. Possible Sources of Deception and Unfairness
1. Fringe Experience and Credence Goods Markets
In a properly functioning market, consumer injury from any
attempted seller deception or unfairness would be likely only in
the sale of expensive, infrequently purchased experience goods or
credence goods where the seller's profitability does not depend on
repeat business. 107 In these situations, where consumers cannot
discern the accuracy of statements before they buy, the threat of
lost repeat business is not a check. Competitors, instead of chal-
lenging the accuracy of a firm's deceptive claim, can increase prof-
itability by using even more outrageous tactics because consumers
cannot discern who is telling the truth. Because of this competitive
synergy, the harmful practices should be clear and extreme and the
consumer injury should be direct and concrete.
Several of the Commission's section 13(b) cases fit squarely
into this catogory. In FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas,0 s for example, the
defendants represented to customers that for an "investment" of
as little as $2,000, the customer would be virtually guaranteed of
acquiring a ten-year federal oil and gas lease that could be sold
within six months for at least $25,000. They represented that for-
mer clients consistently received at least this return on their in-
vestments. In fact, less than one percent of customers acquired
leases. Several of these defendants have been convicted of mail
fraud for these activities.'0 9 In FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc.," 0
defendants sold home business opportunities to manufacture form
molded plastic items. The company represented that they would
supply customers with regular work orders, pay cash for finished
products and customers would have to do no selling. In fact, de-
fendants sent customers few orders and generally did not pay cus-
tomers for finished products. They instructed customers at one
point to send finished products directly to their "warehouse,"
not always function properly. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
107 See Nelson, Advertising, supra note 96, at 730-31, 749-51; see also Nelson, Informa-
tion, supra note 96, at 315-18, 327 (experienced goods sellers may have market power in
some cases).
108 No. 83-1702 CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. filed July 7, 1983).
10I United States v. Wolfson, No. 83-754-CR-Davis (S.D. Fla. convicted Apr. 11, 1985),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Stockton, No. 85-5139 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 1987). See Fraud
Hearings, supra note 8, at 196 (prepared statement of Stanley Marcus).
"10 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985).
[Vol. 61:503
FTC PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
which turned out to be a company that recycled scrap plastic.111
Profits in both of these cases depended primarily on first sales or
subsequent sales made before the purchasers discovered the true
value of the goods or services.
In such cases, the stronger section 13(b) remedies are proper.
The generalist courts should easily be able to find that such outra-
geous practices violate section 5. The stronger judicial remedies are
appropriate because the market provides no meaningful check on
such practices. Inhibiting these practices should impose little coun-
tervailing costs on consumers because the practices serve no useful
purpose. The successful actors in these markets do not sell the
goods and services that the customers believe they are pur-
chasing. 112
2. Market Failures
In other situations, significant deception or unfairness may oc-
cur because of a market failure. Such failures may result from the
cost of producing information and information market imperfec-
tions.1 3 Sellers may often be reluctant to produce information for
which consumers would be willing to pay. Producing information
about a product is costly when one considers the costs of perform-
ing tests or surveys, but once produced it can benefit not only the
seller producing the information, but also competing sellers of the
same product. Thus, sellers producing information do not get all
the benefits from their investments.1 4 Because they cannot cap-
ture the full return on their investments, sellers may provide less
useful information to consumers than that for which consumers
would be willing to pay. Producers may also fail to dispute a com-
petitor's deceptive claims, such as a mouthwash that helps prevent
colds and flu, because the benefits from disputing the claims would
go to all other competitors, yet the cost would be borne by the lone
disputing competitor." 5 In addition, the deceptive claim itself may
" Id. at 1293.
H2 Judge Posner would argue that, if the Commission does anything, it should concen-
trate its efforts in section 13(b) actions against the most egregious of frauds because market
incentives effectively eliminate the risk of meaningful deception in the rest of the market.
See R. POSNER, FTC REGULATION, supra note 96, at 32; Posner, supra note 96, at 76-77
(arguing that "hard core" fraud would be unaffected by cease and desist proceedings).
'1 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 97, at 501-13; Craswell, supra note 97, at
722-25; Pitofsky, supra note 64, at 663-67.
14 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 97, at 503-05.
Judge Posner argues that trade associations can act on behalf of all competitors in
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benefit all competitors, since consumers may believe all
mouthwashes help prevent colds and flu. Consequently, everyone's
sales may increase, further reducing any market incentives to dis-
pute the claims." 6
Further, sellers' representations do not communicate the same
idea to every listener or reader. 117 Every representation has the po-
tential to deceive someone, but it may be too expensive for sellers
to redraft representations to minimize this type of potential,
though unintentional, deception. Even if the seller tried to avoid
potential deception, the resulting representation may be so compli-
cated by disclaimers and qualifications that it communicates no
meaningful information." 8
Aside from imperfections in information markets and the diffi-
culty in communicating ideas, producers with market power may
not have sufficient incentives to treat consumers honestly and
fairly. 119 Regulations and other possible barriers to entry into a
market may insulate producers from competitive forces. Our soci-
ety has many direct regulatory barriers: licensing for doctors, law-
yers, and other professionals; marketing orders for certain agricul-
tural products; allocation of airport landing rights; and licensing of
radio and television stations. We also have other regulations that
raise costs, thereby indirectly inhibiting entry into markets: child
labor laws, wage and hour laws, OSHA safety regulations, and en-
vironmental regulations. Some of these regulations, such as child
labor laws, may serve very useful purposes; others may harm soci-
ety, but it is politically impossible to eliminate them. Given that
these barriers exist, and cannot or should not be removed, some
producers have market power and may not have sufficient incen-
tives to treat consumers honestly and fairly.
When information market imperfections cause unfairness or
deception, section 13(b) permanent injunction actions will gener-
this situation, thus avoiding the problem of one competitor or one consumer bearing the
entire cost of challenging a deceptive claim. Posner, supra note 96, at 65-66. It seems odd to
argue that private, collusive activity by competitors is likely to solve an information market
failure. It is much more likely that these groups will inhibit, rather than promote competi-
tion. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 97, at 505 ("information intermediaries can
achieve a high level of market power"). See generally FTC STAFF REPORT, STANDARDS AND
CERTIFICATION (1978).
116 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 97, at 507-09.
"7 See Craswell, supra note 97, at 668-81.
"' See id.
119 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 97, at 507-09.
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ally be inappropriate because the distinctions are too subtle. In
these situations, the market is not driving competitors toward
more and more outrageous practices, rather, the market is provid-
ing some competitive incentives to avoid unfairness and deception,
but not sufficient incentives to induce sellers to incur the costs to
correct the deception or unfairness. 120 Under these conditions, dif-
ferentiating between situations where the mix of goods and ser-
vices accurately reflects the price that consumers are willing to pay
and those situations where it does not, is a difficult task for gener-
alist courts. Such subtle questions should be left to the Commis-
sion. The Commission, in reality, may be no better than the courts
in drawing these distinctions, but Congress has declared them ex-
perts, and has instructed them to try. 2 ' By leaving these difficult
questions to one decision making body, the resultant rulings
should be more consistent. Moreover, the weaker cease and desist
remedy presents less potential for inducing sellers to overact and
to raise costs to consumers in efforts to overprotect them.
Cases in which unfairness and deception results from market
power would not be proper cases for the generalist courts to de-
cide. As with information market problems, it is often difficult to
discern whether the objectionable practice is unfair or deceptive or
merely a reflection of a properly functioning market. For example,
the Commission's recent credit practices rule outlawed consumer
loans secured by non-purchase money security interests on house-
hold belongings.122 The Commission determined that consumers
had no ability to bargain over security terms of consumer credit
contracts, 23 and that the practice has no countervailing useful
function. Used household furnishings have little resale value and
provide creditors no real collateral. The only real purpose of this
security interest is to harass debtors.' 24
Such security interests, however, may not have been attributa-
ble to the creditors' market power, but merely the result of a mar-
ket efficiently allocating risk between borrower and lender. Bor-
rowers may have preferred assuming this additional risk in
120 See Craswell, supra note 97, at 719-25.
12! FTC Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
,12 See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1986).
123 Credit Practices Rule: Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49
Fed. Reg. 7740, 7745 (1984).
.2 Id. at 7761-67.
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exchange for lower interest rates. Only the person who defaulted
would have paid the costs for accepting the added risk. Lenders
may have preferred the arrangement because they could charge
lower interest rates and more effectively impose the cost of de-
faults on the specific persons that defaulted. Without these secur-
ity interests, lenders either have to find a new tool that effectively
allocates the costs of defaults on defaulting borrowers only, or allo-
cate the costs of defaults to all borrowers. Such cost increases
would, in effect, cause consumers who do not default to subsidize
those who do.
Most market power examples, except perhaps horizontal price
fixing, are subject to equally plausible market perfecting or market
failing hypotheses. 25 Such subtle questions, again, should be left
to the Commission.
C. The Proposed Standard for Determining Proper Cases
The correct legal standard should limit proper cases to those
fringe experience goods and credence goods markets in which sec-
tion 13(b) actions will be most effective. This writer proposes that
such a proxy for non-rule violation cases would require the Com-
mission to prove a misrepresentation of material fact. This is a ba-
sic element of many tort claims, including deceit and fraud in the
inducement.12 6 It is a standard that the courts find comfortable.
Such misrepresentations would clearly be deceptive under section
5.127 The standard should allow section 13(b) to reach most of the
fringe credence and experience goods markets. These actors are the
most likely to use the most outrageous claims about their goods or
services. The standard would also eliminate from section 13(b) ac-
tions those subtler cases that require Commission expertise.
Admittedly, market imperfections may result in misrepresen-
tations of material fact in markets other than those for fringe ex-
perience goods and credence goods. In those situations, however,
courts should be competent to act. Enjoining any such misrepre-
sentations would not require sophisticated analyses of market con-
ditions because such misrepresentations serve no beneficial pur-
pose. Therefore, any overinclusiveness in the standard poses no
"' See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
126 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.1, at 591-93 (1973); PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 95, § 105, at 725-35; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 95, § 3.1, at 229.
121 See infra notes 148-69 and accompanying text.
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threat to the market.
This standard would not address two types of section 5 viola-
tions that may occur in markets for fringe credence goods or expe-
rience goods. First, it would not address the non-deceptive, but
still unfair practice. However, this is more a theoretical problem.
Given the competitive pressures in these markets, the successful
competitor will use misrepresentations as well as unfair practices.
To the extent some purely unfair practices exist, though, they
should be left to the Commission. Unfairness, as the Commission
has defined it, requires measuring whether a net benefit would re-
sult to all consumers and producers by requiring a change in the
practice.128 This measurement is so amorphous that only the Com-
mission should apply it. The Commission has evidently recognized
this point. It has not brought a section 13(b) case based purely on
a claim of unfairness.
The standard also excludes cases in which the harmful prac-
tices are purely omissions of material fact by sellers. This is again
more of a theoretical problem. Given the competitive incentives to
deceive in these fringe markets, cases will almost always include
misrepresentations as well as omissions and the proposed standard
would cover these cases. At any rate, prudence suggests that any
case based solely on omissions should be left to the Commission.
An omission case requires the decisionmaker to consider whether a
particular bit of information has to be told to consumers. Assessing
what information consumers need to know and must receive from
sellers before making decisions is again a subtle question that
should be left to the Commission.129 The threat of disrupting mar-
,"8 The current Commission unfairness standard tests whether the complained of prac-
tice causes: (1) substantial consumer injury, (2) which is not outweighed by any counter-
vailing benefits that the practice produces for consumers or competitors and (3) which con-
sumers cannot reasonably avoid. See International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061
(1984); Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Senators Wendell H. Ford & John C.
Danforth 5-6 (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted as an appendix in International Harvester, 104
F.T.C. at 1073-74 [hereinafter Unfairness Letter]. The standard, in effect, requires deter-
mining whether a change in practices will result in a net benefit to the general welfare. The
standard has included other considerations. See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Label-
ing of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355
(July 2, 1964). But these other considerations have been downplayed. See Unfairness Letter,
supra at 8-10, reprinted in International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1074-75; International
Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1061 n.43.
2I See International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1064-65; Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra
note 97, at 522-23 ("legislators and regulators should be sensitive" to "real dangers" of in-
creasing cost to consumers by mandated disclosures); Craswell, Unfair Acts, supra note 60,
at 120-22; Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S & H, and the FTC's Unfairness Doctrine, 1983
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kets by inducing sellers to provide and charge consumers for infor-
mation consumers do not want is too great. This is particularly
true when most of these fringe cases will also involve misrepresen-
tations thereby making them subject to the standard.
As a separate part of the standard, any trade regulation rule
violation or violation of any statute enforced by the Commission
other than the FTC Act, such as the Truth-in-Lending Act,130
would be a proper case. Rule violations and violations of these
other statutes are special cases because the Commission or Con-
gress has specifically defined the proper conduct for businesses
subject to these rules or statutes.'3 ' Courts can easily enforce these
rules and statutes because of their specificity. The harsher penal-
ties pose no threat of inducing overprotective reactions by produc-
ers because the rules and statutes expressly state the proper prac-
tices that will avoid such penalties.'32
D. The Commission's "Clear" Violation Standard
The proposed standard limiting "proper cases" to fringe expe-
rience and credence goods, with the exceptions noted above, would
work better than the Commission's current definition of a proper
case. The Commission has asserted that any case is a proper case if
the violation is "clear,"'3 3 and that the courts should rely on any
prior Commission precedent on point, any trade regulation rule de-
fining unfair or deceptive practices, or any other statute enforced
by the Commission. The Ninth Circuit has apparently accepted
this definition.13 4 The Commission's standard and the proposed
DuKE L.J. 903, 949-52.
1"I Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-71
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Other statutes enforced by the FTC include the Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1692-1692o (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637,
tit. I, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982)); Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1451-61 (1982)); Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, ch. 871, 54 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Fur Products Labeling Act, ch. 298, 65 Stat. 175
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §9 69-69j (1982)); Hobby Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 93-167, 87 Stat.
686 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2101-06 (1982)); and Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-495, tit. 5, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982)).
' See supra note 130.
132 Id.
"3 E.g., FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at
69,705 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (magistrate's opinion).
"I See, e.g., FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) ("We accord
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standard are in accord that rule violations and violations of other
statutes enforced by the Commission should be proper cases. Case
law indicates that the courts have no difficulty interpreting and
enforcing either the rules or statutes other than the FTC Act.13 5
With regard to actions alleging just unfair or deceptive prac-
tices, however, the Commission's current standard is unworkable
because the Commission's cease and desist decisions offer no
meaningful guidance to the courts. The Commission's decisions
often turn solely on the Commission's expert judgment. The Com-
mission can decide all critical questions concerning how consumers
might perceive and respond to challenged practices based solely on
its own expertise. Essentially, all the Commission needs is proof
that the representation or practice occurred. 136 Thus, the decisions
cannot be applied beyond their specific facts.
Many of the Commission's established doctrines have been
based purely on the Commission's expert judgment. In Pfizer,
Inc. ,'13 the Commission determined that it was an unfair act to
make claims without first having a reasonable basis to substantiate
such claims. 138 The Commission determined that consumers are at
a distinct disadvantage, vis-A-vis manufacturers and distributors,
in gaining information about a product. Manufacturers are in a
better position to efficiently test such claims. Therefore, the Com-
mission concluded, it is unfair practice to make an affirmative
product claim without a reasonable basis.' 39
The Commission also determined in Pfizer that affirmative
product claims without prior substantiation were deceptive. 40 Any
affirmative claim about a product's quality would imply to con-
sumers that at the time the claim was made, the seller had sub-
'considerable weight' to the meaning given a statute by the agency charged with administer-
ing it.").
"' See, e.g., United States v. JS & A Group, Inc., 716 F.2d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1983)
(violation of Mail Order Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (1986)); FTC v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp.,
509 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D. Md.), aff'd, 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1981) (violation of Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act).
131 See American Home Prods. Inc. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 n.10 (3d Cir. 1983); Pitof-
sky, supra note 64, at 677-79.
137 81 F.T.C. 23 (1971).
138 Id. at 23.
139 Id. at 62. "Absent a reasonable basis for a vendor's affirmative product claims, a
consumer's ability to make an economically rational product choice, and a competitor's abil-
ity to compete on the basis of price, quality, service or convenience, are materially impaired
and impeded." Id.
140 See id. at 58-59.
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stantiation for it. If the substantiation did not exist, the implied
representation would not be true; hence, the advertisement would
be deceptive. In Pfizer, the Commission did not find an affirmative
claim which implied existing substantiation. In that same year,
however, in In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 141 the Commission
found that representations made by Firestone that its tires were
"the safe tire," and that one of its tires would "stop 25% quicker,"
constituted affirmative claims that were deceptive because they
lacked prior substantiation. 142
In the Pfizer and Firestone opinions, the Commission cited no
studies or other evidence that consumers actually believed that the
representations had prior substantiation. The Commission cited no
studies on the relative costs to producers and consumers of acquir-
ing the information, or the possible effects of always requiring
prior substantiation of product claims. The Commission relied on
its own expertise. 43
In a more recent case, In re International Harvester Co., 44
the Commission said that it is now using more rigorous analysis,
but the decision in that case rests essentially on the Commission's
expert judgment.'45
141 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112
(1973).
Since these cases, the Commission has repeatedly used the prior substantiation doctrine
to find advertisements either unfair or deceptive; courts have constitutionally upheld these
findings. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), afl'd, 738 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1984); Jay Norris, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 751 (1978), aff'd as modified, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770 (1977), aff'd as modified,
605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); National Dynamics Corp., 82
F.T.C. 488 (1973), aff'd as modified, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993
(1974).
The Commission has also run an advertising substantiation program for over a decade,
requiring businesses to provide the Commission with the substantiation for representations.
See FTC's Policy Statement on Advertising Substantiation Program, 47 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 234 (Aug. 2, 1984); Federal Trade Commission, Special Report Relating to
Advertising Claims, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,058 (1971); see also Note, The FTC Ad Substantiation
Program, 61 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1429-1440 (1973) (business must substantiate most claims made
regarding advertised product).
1 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. at 451-52.
14 As recently as 1982, commentators have criticized the lack of empirical support for
the prior substantiation doctrine. Tolleson, "Efficiency", "Cost Benefits" and Other Key
Words-The Practical Uses of Economics at the FTC, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 581, 584-85 (1982).
See also Craswell, supra note 97, at 709-14 (substantiation doctrine lacks definition of what
is "reasonable basis" for claim); Pitofsky, supra note 64, at 681-83 (substantiation program
questionable in value, costs and benefits and perhaps constitutionally infirm).
... 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
145 Id. In International Harvester, the practice complained of was International Har-
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E. Courts Cannot Rely on General Deception Principles
The Commission realizes that courts cannot rely on Commis-
sion precedents. In its non-rule violation section 13(b) actions, the
Commission, with one exception, has not relied on specific existing
Commission precedents to guide the courts.1 46 Rather, it has pri-
marily brought cases against companies similar to those in FTC v.
U.S. Oil & Gas 4" and FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc. 45 The prac-
tices there were so egregiously deceptive that the courts found the
practices illegal with little or no analysis of whether the practices
were either unfair or deceptive. The Commission's clear violation
standard worked only because the practices were so outrageous
that the courts did not have to delve into the meaning of section 5.
The proposed standard of a misrepresentation of material fact also
would have clearly reached these schemes.
The Commission's clear violation standard has not worked in
cases alleging less egregious practices. In three cases, FTC v.
Furman,49 FTC v. Evans Products Co.,' 50 and FTC v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,151 the Commission attempted to rely
on general principles of section 5 deception. The Commission
failed to secure at least part of the relief it sought in all of these
cases. These cases demonstrate that courts cannot, or will not, ap-
ply the Commission's general principle of a section 5 deception
consistently with either Commission precedents or each other.
vester's failure to disclose to customers the danger of fuel geysering (heated gasoline shoot-
ing out of gas tank in streams up to 20 feet high) in its gasoline-powered tractors if the gas
cap was loosened or removed while the engine was running. Id. at 1051-55. In concluding
that the practice was unfair, the Commission cited no analysis of the costs to International
Harvester to notify customers, or whether the notice would reduce the threat of accidents.
Nor did the Commission cite anything other than anecdotal evidence concerning whether
customers would anticipate the danger of fuel geysering and avoid the harm without the
company's notice. See id. at 1064-67.
"I FTC v. Intra-Medic Formulations, Inc., No. 85-2819 (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 11, 1985) (§
5(m) claim for civil penalties combined with the § 13(b) action). The FTC in Intra-Medic
relied upon Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770 (1977) (involving weight reduction plans),
aff'd as modified, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980), and Keele
Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1840 (1959) (involving baldness cures), afl'd, 275
F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
'17 No. 83-1702 CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. filed July 7, 1983). See supra note 108 and ac-
companying text.
18 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
149 No. 84-803-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
35 No. C85-45M (W.D. Wash. order denying injunctive relief filed Feb. 27, 1985), aff'd,
775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985).
"' 580 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part, 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Before discussing these cases in detail, a brief description of cur-
rent Commission deception analysis is in order. The description is
necessary to understand the inconsistencies between these cases
and current Commission analysis, as well as the problems that
such judicial decisions may cause in the future.
1. General Principles of Deception
Complicating any court's ability to apply the Commission's
general deception principles is the current uncertainty about those
principles. Prior to 1983, the Commission defined deception as an
act that had a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers.152 The
Commission then changed the wording of the definition of decep-
tion to an act that: (1) had a likelihood to deceive consumers; (2)
acting reasonably in the circumstances; (3) in a material way (or to
their detriment).153 The Commission claims that the new wording
did not change the existing law, but only clarified it.'" Under ei-
ther wording, a practice, usually a representation or omission, is
deceptive if it has a sufficient potential to deceive a sufficient num-
ber of appropriate consumers to a sufficient degree. The actor's in-
tent is irrelevant.155
The Commission's decisions and policy statements have added
to these criteria. The pre-1983 decisions typically described the
sufficient potential to deceive as a "tendency or capacity to mis-
lead.' 56 The Commission's new wording is "likelihood or propen-
152 Id.
'" FTC's Policy Statement on Deception Sent to Chairmen of the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Comm. and House Energy and Commerce Comm., reprinted in
45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 689-90, 694 (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC Decep-
tion Statement].
I" This writer believes the new Commission standard will make it more difficult to
prove deception. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the new standard imposed a higher burden of
proof on the Commission. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir.
1986). For further discussion of this issue, see Bailey & Pertschuk, The Law of Deception:
The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 849 (1984); Craswell, supra note 97, at 696-714;
Fraser, supra note 64, at 551-62; Sullivan & Marks, The FTC's Deceptive Advertising Pol-
icy: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REV. 593, 604-18 (1986); Deception Policy
Statement Prepared by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk and Transmitted on Feb. 29
to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 372, 379-87 (Mar. 1, 1984) [hereinafter Dissenting Deception Statement].
"5 See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78-81 (1934); Regina Corp. v. FTC,
322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963).
"I See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687, n.10 (3d Cir.
1983). See Dissenting Deception Statement, supra note 154, at 379-87.
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sity of deception.' 1 57 Neither wording requires the Commission to
find actual deception, only the potential for deception. In making
this determination, the Commission looks at the overall impression
of the representation. If the overall impression is subject to multi-
ple interpretations, and one interpretation is deceptive, the repre-
sentation is deceptive. Even if the representation is literally true,
as long as the overall impression is deceptive, the representation
violates section 5. Representations that omit material information
are deceptive. Affirmative claims about a product or service which
the seller has not previously substantiated are deceptive because
they imply that such substantiation exists.15 General slogans such
as "Coke Is It" or "Baseball, Hot Dogs, Apple Pie and Chevrolet"
or "the best hamburger in town," however, are deemed to be mere
puffery and are not deceptive.25 9
The deceptive practices must have the potential to deceive a
sufficient number of appropriate consumers."' ° The Commission
has kept this requirement flexible. One case has indicated that less
than fifteen percent could be a sufficient number."6 ' The percent-
age may vary according to the nature of the deceptive practice and
the severity of the potential harm. Threats to health and safety
would be deceptive even though they deceived very few appropri-
ate consumers.
16 2
The appropriate consumer has been described as the "'aver-
117 FTC Deception Statement, supra note 153, at 690-91.
I'l See Pfzier, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 58-59 (1971). See also supra notes 137-41 and accom-
panying text.
"I In the Analgesics cases, for example, representations such as "Bayer works won-
ders," were mere puffery, but other claims designed to create the impression that a given
non-prescription, aspirin-based pain reliever was unique or better than the others were
found to be deceptive. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963)); American Home Prods.
Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 707 (3d Cir. 1983).
The Commission also found two of the advertisements misleading because of omissions.
In Bristol-Meyers, the Commission found deceptive the claim that doctors recommended
Bufferin more than any other "leading brand" because the advertisement omitted the fact
that some data indicated that doctors recommended Tylenol, Ascriptin and generic aspirin
more often than Bufferin. Bristol-Meyers, 738 F.2d at 563. In Sterling Drug, the Commis-
sion found representations that Midol had an "exclusive formula" to be deceptive because
the advertisement failed to disclose that Midol contained aspirin. Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 741 F.2d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1984).
Io See Dissenting Deception Statement, supra note 154, at 387-94.
101 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 451-54, affd as modified, 481 F.2d
246, 249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
"I See Dissenting Deception Statement, supra note 154, at 393.
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age' or 'ordinary' person in the audience addressed,' 16 3 or "some-
one of any intelligence."'1 4 The courts have described these per-
sons essentially as the "trusting,' ' 6 5 or the "ignorant, unthinking
and the credulous.' 6 6 The Commission has said though, that the
appropriate consumer does not include the fool. The Commission's
classic example is that it will not protect persons who would be-
lieve that all Danish pastry is imported from Denmark.6 7 The
Commission's 1983 wording refers to misleading consumers "acting
reasonably under the circumstances." 8
The Commission has added a caveat that it may test practices
directed at particular segments of the population according to
their potential to deceive those appropriate consumers.' 9 The
Commission has used this principle largely to adopt a higher stan-
dard to protect groups perceived as particularly vulnerable, such as
children 70 or pregnant women.''
3 Pitofsky, supra note 64, at 675.
'" See Millstein, supra note 64, at 460; Note, supra note 64, at 1040-43.
... See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained
and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive
others less experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the
honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the
trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has long since
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of
caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.
Id.
166 Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
... See Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), afl'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1964).
"I FTC Deception Statement, supra note 153, at 691-93. To be consistent with the
case law, "acting reasonably" must refer to the consumer's act of perceiving and under-
standing the representation and not his or her subsequent decision based on that under-
standing. See Craswell, supra note 97, at 699-704 (no definition of "reasonableness" in cases
discussed in FTC Deception Statement). Thus, the one who has the impression that the
phrase "Danish pastry" means imported from Denmark is not "acting reasonably." But the
one who is told in an unsolicited telephone sales presentation that he will make a fortune if
he sends $3,000 to an address on the other side of the country "acts reasonably" when he
understands the representation to be that he will make a fortune, even though he would
arguably have to be very trusting or unthinking to actually believe the representation and
send the check.
19 See Dissenting Deception Statement, supra note 154, at 390-91; Pitofsky, supra
note 64, at 676.
17 See, e.g., FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934) (competitive
method which exploits children "who are unable to protect themselves" unfair); Stuppell
Originals, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173, 187-88 (1965) (failure to disclose possibility of injury to chil-
dren consumers unfair and deceptive practice).
"I See, e.g., Savitch, 50 F.T.C. 828, 834 (1954) (advertisement playing on fears of preg-
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Finally, the potential deception must be sufficiently signifi-
cant. This element has not been a significant issue in the case law.
In American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, the Third Circuit said
that, "[o]nce the Commission finds deception, it is normally al-
lowed to infer materiality.' 17 2 As long as the deceptive practice
might have some effect, it is material. The deception does not have
to be the deciding factor in the consumer's decision. It is clear
from prior decisions that the Commission is not required to find
actual injury resulting from the deception.173 The new formulation
states that the deception is material if it would likely cause con-
sumers to act to their detriment, but, again, does not require proof
of actual injury. Even with its embellishments, the Commission's
deception principles call for the decisionmaker to divine possible
effects of practices that may harm some consumers. Furthermore,
these principles are so open-ended that the courts cannot apply
them consistently with the Commission. 4 Three cases, FTC v.
nancy constitutes unfair and deceptive act), affd, 218 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955).
172 American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 688, n.11 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965). See Dissenting Deception State-
ment, supra note 154, at 394-98.
171 See, e.g., Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 7, 147-50 (1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 1431
(9th Cir. 1986); Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788-91 (1984); Cliffdale Assocs., 103
F.T.C. 110, 165-74 (1984). See Fraser, supra note 64, at 551-62 (indicating that Commission
may be requiring more extrinsic evidence of meaning of a representation, but not evidence
of actual injury).
See also FTC Deception Statement, supra note 153, at 690. Certain types of claims are
presumptively material: express claims; false claims; omitted information which "the seller
knew, or should have known" consumers would need; and representations "pertaining to the
central characteristics of the product or service." Claims or omissions significantly involving
"health, safety or other areas with which the reasonable consumer would be concerned" are
also now considered material. The Commission will infer materiality in an implied claim
"that a seller intended to make." Id. at 694.
'7' Courts apply a standard similar to section 5 deception in private actions under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). See FTC v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375
F. Supp. 777, 781-83 (N.D. Ill. 1974); J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMsPETITION
358-59 (1984); Keller, Private Regulation of Advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563. But even if courts have experience with a similar
standard, this does not show any competence to interpret section 5 consistently with the
Commission. See Brown & Williamson, 778 F.2d at 40 n.1. The section 13(b) cases indicate
that they cannot.
In 1977, Professor Pitofsky hinted at the possibility of section 13(b) actions, but be-
lieved that little would come of it because of the difficulty of proving section 5 deception
and stated that "[t]his statute may not lead to new remedial initiatives, because, except for
blatant frauds, deceptive advertising cases involve complicated evidentiary issues relating to
the meaning of the and the adequacy of substantiation." Pitofsky, supra note 64, at 692-93
n.128.
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Furman,17 5 FTC v. Evans Products Co.,1'7 and FTC v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,7 demonstrate this point.
2. FTC v. Furman
In Furman, the court rejected the Commission's evidence of
fraud, but still found the defendant's practices to be deceptive.
The defendants offered "hair analysis" services and advertised in
both medical professional journals and popular magazines. 178 For
$36.95, defendants would perform a spectroscopic analysis of a per-
son's hair. Defendants' popular magazine advertisements stated
that hair analysis would show your "body's mineral excesses and
deficiencies," and the report would "clearly recommend WHICH
supplements to take and WHEN to take them." Defendants' ad-
vertisements in health care professional journals represented that
hair analysis was, "more accurate than blood or urine analysis to
measure toxic and nutrient mineral levels." Customers would mail
hair samples and $36.95 to the defendants in return for a computer
printout and a list of recommended vitamins and other nutritional
supplements. At the same time, in a separate mailing under a dif-
ferent corporate name, they also sent materials offering for sale the
vitamins, minerals and other supplements which the report
recommended. 7 9
The Commission sent in six hair samples over six weeks to the
defendants, and concurrently had the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (the "FDA") test samples from the same hair. According to
the FDA, the defendants' analyses were substantially incorrect.
The defendants explained that their equipment was not working
properly during this particular period and was replaced shortly
thereafter. The court believed the defendants' explanation of mal-
functioning machinery and did not find deception based on the
Commission's six samples. 80
The court did find deception, however, in the defendants' ad-
vertising directed toward the general public. These advertisements
gave the impression that the personalized hair analysis would, by
itself, give the consumer sufficient information to know what nutri-
,' No. 84-0803 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
176 No. C85-45m (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1985), af'd, 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985).
" 580 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1983), af/'d in part, 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
178 FTC v. Furman, No. 84-0803-A, slip op. at 3-7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
:79 Id. at 6.
10 Id. at 7-8.
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tional supplements he or she needed. The advertisements were
found to be deceptive because:
the consumer is not told in the advertisements, as he or she ought
to be told, that hair analysis is only a guide, not a panacea, to be
used with a health care professional in determining what mineral
excesses and deficiencies exist in the whole body and what nutri-
ents to take to correct those excesses and deficiencies.181
The court was clearly concerned that consumer self-medication,
based only on the hair analysis, was a health threat.'82
The court found a deceptively unqualified representation of
fact and, thus, granted injunctive relief. The rest of the court's
opinion indicated that absent a clear deception, it would not grant
relief. In so doing, the court ignored and, arguably, ruled inconsis-
tently with, current Commission deception analysis. The court
stated that the defendants included adequate disclaimers with the
printout report'83 but that the disclaimers failed to alleviate the
deception because "they [came] after the customer has parted with
his or her $36.95," and because they were lost when surrounded by
the other claims and marketing techniques.'
The court implied that the disclaimers would prevent decep-
tion if properly placed in the initial advertisements. Under current
Commission analysis, however, even qualified statements, if made
in connection with affirmative claims, would be deceptive unless
supported by prior substantiation.8 5 The disclaimers still repre-
181 Id. at 11.
182 Id. at 10. The court emphasized, "[we] are here dealing with health care-not a sale
of vacuum cleaners." Id.
183 Id. at 9. The disclaimers said:
[A]ll of the above information is not intended to be for the diagnosis, prevention
or treatment of any disease, or for the assessment of any medical condition....
[T]he following recommended supplementation in your diet is not meant to be
prescriptive but as a guide for a healthier, happier life .... [Flor best results it is
recommended that these supplements be taken after consultation with your nutri-
tionist or nutritionally oriented physician.
Complaint exhibit D, FTC v. Furman, No. 84-803-A (E.D. Va. filed Aug. 7, 1984). The
court's analysis closely tracks the Commission's prior substantiation doctrine. The unquali-
fied statements are deceptive because the existing scientific evidence does not support them
and the qualifiers are inadequate because they are not available to consumers at the point of
sale. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. The Commission did not plead that
the advertisements were deceptive because they lacked prior sustantiation, which may indi-
cate that the Commission does not want courts to set precedents concerning issues such as
what is a sufficient reasonable basis for a representation.
18 Furman, No. 84-0803-A, slip op. at 8-10 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
885 See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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sented hair analysis to be "a guide for a healthier, happier life."
Based on Commission precedent, this representation may still con-
stitute an affirmative claim.18 If it does, the scientific evidence
probably does not support it. The court said the evidence, "at
best," showed a hair analysis to be a useful guide "only to health
care professionals."
The Furman court also refused to enjoin advertisements di-
rected to health care professionals. The court reasoned that "[t]he
evils present in advertisements aimed at and reports received by
direct consumers without the intervention of a health care profes-
sional, do not exist when the hair sample is submitted by, and the
report rendered to, a health care professional.118 7 If the court
meant that the advertisements directed at this particular
group-health care professionals-did not have a tendency or like-
lihood to deceive them, and, therefore, presented no "evil," this
would be consistent with the Commission's deception standard.
However, the court more likely meant that the threat of injury
to consumers' health through self-medication would not be present
when analyses were sent to professionals. If so, the court changed
the central focus of its analysis from whether the representations
or practices had a tendency or likelihood to deceive to whether ac-
tual injury would result. Proof of injury has never been part of
section 5 deception analysis. Even the Commission's new emphasis
on materiality would find affirmative representation, such as hair
analysis is more accurate than blood or urine analysis, to be mate-
rial. 88 The Furman court, in its analysis of both the disclaimers
and the potential to deceive professionals, seemed to require a ma-
terial misrepresentation of fact. More significantly, it has at least
implied that proof of actual injury is necessary to award monetary
relief under section 5. If the proposed standard had been in place,
the court would have enjoined the same activity and would have
avoided a judicial interpretation of section 5 inconsistent with
Commission precedent.
"IS Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 458 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973) (Firestone's statement "the safe tire" was an
affirmative representation that its tires were free from manufacturers' defects).
117 Furman, No. 84-0803-A, slip op. at 12 (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
"' See supra note 173.
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3. FTC v. Evans Products Co.
In Evans Products, the Commission alleged that Evans sold
do-it-yourself home building kits through high interest consumer
credit loans and represented to purchasers that, upon completion
of the home, purchasers would receive long term loans at lower
rates. The Commission alleged that lower interest loans were not
provided.18 9 The Commission sought a preliminary injunction to
stop Evans Products from foreclosing on the consumers' houses.
The trial court denied the Commission's motion for a preliminary
injunction because Evans Products had stopped selling the house
kits more than two years earlier.190 The court also held that the
Commission did not demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success
on the merits because the written materials "[did] not appear to be
misleading to an average and unsophisticated person," and that
there was "some leeway for a certain amount of 'puffing.' "I"' The
court further noted that the defendants' representation did not vi-
olate Truth-in-Lending Act regulations.9 2
The Evans court did not explain why the representations did
not reach the level of a tendency or likelihood to deceive. It did
not even quote the questioned representations. Like the court in
Furman, the court seemed willing to let stand ambiguous state-
ments short of material misrepresentations of fact. Also, like
Furman, the court interpreted section 5 inconsistently with the
Commission's deception standard, particularly with reference to
Truth-in-Lending Act regulations. The court at least implied that
such regulations were a safe harbor from section 5 claims. Those
regulations are irrelevant to deception analysis.'93
4. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
In Brown & Williamson, unlike Furman and Evans, the court
rigorously applied the Commission's deception analysis; although
in the end, it still seemed to require proof of a misrepresentation
"8' Plaintiff's Complaint 8-29, FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., No. C85-45M (W.D. Wash.
filed Jan. 11, 1985).
100 FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., No. C85-45M, slip op. at 3-5 (W.D. Wash. filed Feb. 28,
1985), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985).
101 Id. at 5. The court said proof of oral misrepresentation would require extensive tes-
timony not yet presented before the court. Id. at 6.
102 Id. at 7.
103 See, e.g., Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464, 863-64 (1981) (compliance with regulations
cannot be construed as immunizing a company from scrutiny under § 5).
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of material fact. Indeed, in one part of the opinion, the court ar-
guably decided the case inconsistently with the Commission's stan-
dard. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ("B&W"), a major ciga-
rette manufacturer, had developed the Barclay, an ultra-low tar
cigarette. Since 1970, the FTC has tested cigarettes for tar and nic-
otine content. Manufacturers, including B&W, voluntarily printed
the FTC ratings on their packaging and advertising. 1 " Although
the Barclay initially tested at one milligram tar, 9 5 the Commission
later determined that the rating was inaccurate. The Barclay's fil-
ter was designed to produce more tar when smoked by humans
than when smoked by testing machines and actually delivered
more tar to smokers than comparably rated cigarettes. 196 The
Commission, after discovering this fact, deleted its rating of the
Barclay. 197
B&W, however, continued to advertise the Barclay as a one
milligram tar cigarette. The advertisement's fine print stated the
rating was by a method supported by independent laboratories.
But for the small print, the one milligram tar rating appeared
identical to FTC rating disclosures on other cigarette advertis-
ing. 98 B&W also advertised that the Barclay was "99% tar
free." 99 The Commission sued to enjoin B&W's representations.
The Commission alleged that the one milligram claim would de-
ceptively mislead consumers into believing that the Barclay was
comparable to cigarettes rated one milligram by the FTC, and that
the "99% tar free" slogan deceptively suggested to consumers that
the Barclay was "virtually free of tar."200
The court decided that consumers would believe the Barclay
rating to be comparable to FTC ratings. Moreover, B&W had pre-
viously admitted the importance of the ratings to consumers. In a
related proceeding, B&W sued the FTC to enjoin withdrawal of
the FTC one milligram rating of the Barclay, alleging that the FTC
ratings had become a "vital part of the industry" because consum-
ers had come "to accept and rely upon those numbers." 0' 1
1", FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 580 F. Supp. 981, 983 n.7 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd in part, 778 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
... Id. at 983.
196 Id. at 983-84.
Id. at 984.
... Id. at 986-87.
... Id. at 983.
200 Id. at 984.
20 Id. at 983 n.8.
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The court, relying on expert testimony and the appearance of
the advertisement, decided that the fine print disclosure acknowl-
edging the rating to be other than the FTC's was inadequate. The
disclosure did not change the overall impression that the one milli-
gram tar rating was comparable to the FTC one milligram tar rat-
ings. The court also noted that no disclosure appeared on the ciga-
rette package itself. Based on this, and the scientific evidence that
the Barclay was not comparable to other one milligram cigarettes,
the court enjoined Barclay's one milligram claim.2" 2
The court found the one milligram claim to be a misrepresen-
tation of fact because B&W conceded that consumers considered
tar and nicotine ratings material and used such ratings to compare
brands. B&W, thus, published a rating which was not comparable
to ratings on other brands, but which B&W conceded consumers
would believe was comparable.
Relying primarily on consumer surveys, the Brown & William-
son court rejected the Commission's allegation that the "99% tar
free" claim was deceptive. 0 The court concluded that consumers
did not associate "99% tar free" claim with any particular milli-
gram tar rating but, at best, considered the representation a gen-
eral low tar claim.
The court ruled this way despite B&W's survey which indi-
cated that ten percent of those questioned who were familiar with
the Barclay ads associated the "99% tar free" claim with one milli-
gram tar. 4 Cigarette smoking directly affects consumers' health;
thus, the percentage of consumers potentially deceived about the
tar content of the Barclay should not have to be large to establish
a tendency to deceive. 20 5 The ten percent figure might have been
sufficient under the Commission analysis.
F. Effectiveness of the Proposed Standard
The proposed standard would have worked well in the Com-
mission's cases to date. The Commission would have reached rule
violations and violations of other statutes, as well as those egre-
gious experience and credence goods situations, such as U.S. Oil &
202 Id. at 986-90.
202 Id. at 989-90.
Il Id. at 989 n.50.
201 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text; see also Dissenting Deception
Statement, supra note 154, at 393 (sellers of products which may cause personal harm
should be subject to more stringent advertising standards than others).
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Gas and Kitco,20 6 that economic theory suggests should be appro-
priate for section 13(b) actions. Limiting non-rule violation section
5 proper cases to those involving misrepresentations of material
fact would not limit the effective scope of section 13(b) actions.
Furman, Evans, and Brown & Williamson indicate that courts will
find section 5 violations only on proof of such misrepresentations.
Adopting a misrepresentation of material fact as the standard
for non-rule violation section 5 cases would, however, take courts
out of the business of interpreting section 5. Courts would decide
whether the facts presented a proper case. A ruling against the
Commission would not be a finding that the objectional acts were
legal under section 5, but only that the situation was not a proper
case for permanent relief under section 13(b).
Without such a formal, separate standard for proper cases, the
Furman, Evans, and Brown & Williamson courts established
precedents that interpreted section 5 inconsistently with each
other and with prior Commission precedents. The Furman court
focused more on the threat of actual consumer injury through self-
medication than on the deceptive characteristics of the advertise-
ments. The Evans court implied that other regulatory disclosure
requirements were relevant to determining section 5 deception.
The Brown & Williamson court followed the Commission's "ten-
dency to deceive" analysis, but refused to enjoin a representation
that the Commission might well have stopped on the same evi-
dence. Section 13(b) cases such as these would inevitably lead to
divergent and conflicting lines of authority on the meaning of sec-
tion 5.207 The Commission would not be compelled to follow dis-
trict court interpretations in its administrative proceedings, but it
could not overturn them.08 In subsequent section 13(b) actions,
the district courts would follow their own precedents rather than
20. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
207 The Commission has realized the potential for conflicting interpretations and has
demonstrated concern over proposals to authorize state attorney generals to bring actions
under section 5. See 60 Minutes with Terry Calvani, Acting Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 278-79 (1986).
208 For example, the Commission could have begun cease and desist proceedings against
Brown & Williamson for the "99% tar free" claim even after the district court's judgment.
See FTC v. Brown & Williamson Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982). Whether the Commission found the repre-
sentation deceptive would not affect the district court decision's precedential value. In that
district, the court's opinion would be controlling in the next case brought by the
Commission.
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the Commission's opinions. Consequently, at least two separate
meanings of "unfair and deceptive" would result.
Adopting the proposed standard for proper cases avoids this
problem. It gives section 13(b) actions the scope they theoretically
require and, at the same time, returns to the Commission control
over the meaning of unfair and deceptive by eliminating trial level
judicial interpretations of section 5.
IV. THE PROPER PROOF
Although section 13(b) expressly authorizes only injunctions
by invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the court, it also autho-
rizes any other appropriate equitable remedy. The Supreme Court,
in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,2°9 established that whenever a
statute authorizes a federal agency to seek an equitable remedy,
the district court may fashion any equitable order reasonably nec-
essary for complete justice in light of the statutory purposes. 210
The full panoply of equitable remedies is available unless expressly
prohibited by statute.21" ' Under this principle, federal courts have
awarded broad equitable relief, including equitable monetary judg-
ments, to federal agencies under a variety of federal statutes. 2
Two circuit courts of appeals have upheld the district court's au-
thority to grant broad preliminary and permanent equitable relief
under section 13(b).21 3 The Commission has sought primarily two
remedies in section 13(b) cases: injunctions and equitable mone-
tary redress judgments. It has sought this relief against businesses,
owners and operators of these businesses, sales managers, and even
209 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
210 Id. at 400.
211 Id. at 398. "Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to
be recognized and applied." Id.
212 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960) (Secretary
of Labor enforcing Fair Labor Standards Act); Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States,
334 U.S. 110 (1948) (Department of Justice enforcing Sherman Act); CFTC v. Co Petro
Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982) (CFTC enforcing Commodities Ex-
change Act); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (SEC enforc-
ing 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act). See Ellsworth, Disgorgement in
Securities Fraud Actions by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641, 642-47; Farrand, Ancillary Rem-
edies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. Rpv. 1779, 1780-84 (1976).
213 See FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); FTC
v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982). These courts, however, have not
examined the proof necessary to secure redress judgments, or the proper measure of
recovery.
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some sales personnel.2 14 To prevent violations during the pendency
of the action and to preserve assets, the Commission has also
sought and secured preliminary injunctions, asset freeze orders,
and appointments of receivers. 15 Equity courts must decide
whether the Commission can secure such relief solely on a showing
of a proper case, or whether congressional goals dictate that the
Commission prove more, such as intent or actual injury.21 Con-
gress' only express guidance is that there must be proper proof.
This section attempts to define what proper proof is in light of
congressional goals.
A. Injunctions
Courts should grant injunctions against deceptive practices on
proof of a proper case without regard to injury, intent or any other
additional element. Injunctive relief has the prospective, corrective
effect always sought by Congress. In the 1914 Act and the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, Congress sought to stop unfair
and deceptive practices in their incipiency without imposing liabil-
ity for past acts.2117 In 1974, Congress added injunctive relief be-
cause cease and desist orders lacked that swiftness.21 Given Con-
gress' intent, courts should grant prospective injunctive relief just
on proof of a proper case. Courts appear to be granting prospective
injunctive relief without proof of any additional elements. In
Furman, Evans, and Brown & Williamson, the denial of injunc-
tions reflect a failure to prove a misrepresentation of material fact
rather than a failure to prove any additional element. In rule viola-
tion cases, the courts readily grant injunctive relief on proof of the
violation.2 19
214 See, e.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas, No. 83-1702 CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. filed July 7,
1983) (order denying motion to vacate), aff'd, 748 F.2d 1431, 1433-35 (11th Cir. 1984) (re-
printing district court opinion in appendix). See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220-22.
21 U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 1432.
21I A few district court and magistrate opinions have discussed whether additional ele-
ments must be proven and have debated the proper measure of recovery. See FTC v. Kitco
of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1292-95 (D. Minn. 1985); FTC v. International Diamond
Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,708-709 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (mag. opinion);
FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,506, at 68,459 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (mag. opinion).
2. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
21 See United States v. JS & A Group, Inc., 716 F.2d 451, 455-57 (7th Cir. 1983); FTC
v. Virginia Homes Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 58-59 (D. Md.), afJ'd, 661 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.
1981).
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B. Redress Judgments
Courts have the authority under section 13(b) to fashion any
remedy "reasonably necessary for complete justice" in light of the
congressional purposes now incorporated into the FTC Act. The
1975 Improvement Act authorized non-punitive equitable mone-
tary remedies for rule violations and for unfair or deceptive prac-
tices which a reasonable person would have known under the cir-
cumstances were dishonest or fraudulent.2" Congress authorized
these remedies to compensate injured consumers and to deter vio-
lations. Thus, courts should develop standards for the proper proof
and measures of recovery for redress judgments that will most ef-
fectively meet the goals of deterrence and compensation, as man-
dated by the 1975 Improvement Act.
1. The Need for Deterrence
Of these two goals, deterrence should be paramount. The
Commission brings public law enforcement actions. The public, as
a whole, benefits far more from deterring future deceptive acts
than by compensating specific individuals for past injuries, partic-
ularly when injured consumers often have private actions available
as a remedy.2 21 The Commission should compensate injuries with
the recovered funds, but its primary focus should be deterrence.
The proper proof and the measure of recovery should thus be set
to provide the optimal deterrent effect. An effective deterrent will
induce potential wrongdoers to decide against committing wrongful
acts because the penalties they could receive for committing those
acts outweigh the rewards.222 The potential wrongdoer, in estimat-
ing the penalty he might receive, considers two primary factors:
220 FTC Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (1982). See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text. Generally equity will not award relief without a showing of an inadequate remedy at
law. See D. DOBBS, supra note 126, § 9.4, at 618-21; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 95, § 3.7(b), at
261-63. This is not a limitation here, though, because Congress determined that equitable
relief was appropriate in these cases when it enacted section 13(b). See supra notes 90-95,
209-13 and accompanying text.
221 See FTC v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit
ruled that the Commission could not use section 13(b) against sellers who had long ceased
operations because the primary goal of such an action was deterrence, not compensation. Id.
at 1086-88.
222 See R. POSNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 205-12 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS]; Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 172-85 (1968); Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHL L. REV. 652, 653-57 (1983).
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the probability of being punished at all, and the severity of that
possible punishment.223 As the likelihood of punishment decreases,
the severity of the penalty must increase to maintain the same de-
terrent effect.224 The deterrent effect of section 13(b) actions,
therefore, is a function of the probability that wrongdoers will be
subject to redress orders, and of the size of the redress judgments
themselves.
Absent a statutory change, the deterrent effect of section 13(b)
actions is seriously limited. The financial constraints on the Com-
mission and other law enforcement agencies limit the probability
that wrongdoers will face either civil or criminal liability. The
Commission estimated in 1984 that over 500 deceptive investment
schemes similar to those in U.S. Oil & Gas and International Dia-
mond were in existence, yet the Commission, because of limited
resources and other factors, brought only seven actions against
such companies.225 Similarly, the resources of other law enforce-
ment agencies permit only a small number of enforcement ac-
tions.2 6 Moreover, under the general equity powers invoked by
section 13(b), courts may not grant punitive sanctions. Congress
expressly prohibited punitive sanctions in its authorization of re-
dress under section 19. Thus, redress orders cannot exceed estab-
lished equitable compensatory measures of recovery.
Within these limitations, courts should maximize the deter-
rent effect possible by: (1) awarding the maximum, non-punitive
recovery consistent with general equitable principles and (2) keep-
ing the required proper proof to the minimum consistent with the
policies of the FTC Act. The less the Commission must prove, the
greater the probability that it will secure a judgment. The judicial
opinions to date, although not completely consistent, seem to be
limiting the necessary proof and awarding the maximum, non-pu-
nitive award.
223 Becker separates out the probability of being caught as an additional consideration.
See Becker, supra note 222, at 176-79. For simplicity, this consideration is incorporated into
the probability of being punished.
224 See R. POSNER, ECoNomic ANALYSIS, supra note 222, at 207; Becker, supra note 222,
at 185-90.
225 See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 217, 220-22.
226 See generally Fraud Hearings, supra note 8.
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2. The Developing Judicial Standards
a. The International Diamond Standard
Two magistrates' opinions in FTC v. International Diamond
Corp. ,227 provide the most thorough analysis of the elements of sec-
tion 13(b) redress awards. The defendants in International Dia-
mond sold gemstones at inflated prices by misrepresenting the
stones' market value and investment value. The magistrate ruled
in the first opinion that the restitutionary measure of recovery for
fraudulent misrepresentation-the greater of the claimant's loss or
wrongdoer's gain-was the correct measure.228 The second opinion
held that each participant with actual knowledge or reckless indif-
ference would be jointly and severally liable for the greater of the
consumer loss or the defendants' gain attributable to that defend-
ant's participation or control of the operation.229
The court applied a high restitutionary measure of recovery,
usually available for only fraudulent misrepresentation. The mea-
sure of recovery for innocent misrepresentation is the amount of
the benefit received by the wrongdoer up to the amount of the
claimant's loss.2 30 The difference often may not be significant. In
most of the Commission's fraud cases to date, the consumers' loss
has been total. Thus, both the benefit and the loss equalled the
amount consumers paid. In these cases the amount of recovery
would be the same under either fraudulent or innocent misrepre-
sentation measures.23 1 Nevertheless, benefits to wrongdoers and
losses to consumers may not always be equal. In such cases, the
measure for fraudulent misrepresentation could permit a higher re-
227 FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (mag. opinion); FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T
65,506 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (mag. opinion).
228 International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at T 68,459. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 126, §§ 9.2, 9.4, at 595-97, 620-21; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 95, § 3.7, at 259-63.
229 International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,725, at 69,709. The
magistrate was following a district court opinion in FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 1982-83 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,011, at 70,619 (N.D. Cal. 1982). See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
The International Diamond rulings have been followed in FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612
F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (D. Minn. 1985).
2:0 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 155 introductory note (1937); D. DOBBS, supra
note 126, § 9.4, at 629-31.
221 See, e.g., Kitco, 612 F. Supp. at 1295-96. The Kitco court, applying the measure of
recovery for fraud, entered a judgment against individual defendants for the total amounts
paid by customers, over $500,000. The amount would have been the same under the mea-
sure for innocent misrepresentation. Id.
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covery. Neither measure alone would provide a meaningful deter-
rent because the wrongdoer's expected liability would rarely exceed
his expected benefit significantly.
The more important deterrent of International Diamond may
result from the imposition of joint and several liability. Joint and
several liability significantly increases the potential liability to
which any single wrongdoer might be subject. For example, in In-
ternational Diamond, the estimated consumer losses exceeded
$100,000,000.232 The threat that each wrongdoer might be liable for
the entire loss from schemes such as the one illustrated in Interna-
tional Diamond may provide a meaningful deterrent.3 3
The International Diamond magistrate also limited the proof
of consumer reliance and injury that the Commission had to pro-
duce in non-rule violation cases.23 4 Usually, the party seeking equi-
table restitution must prove reliance on the misrepresentation, and
prove resulting injury.235 Requiring the Commission to prove that
232 See Fraud Hearings, supra note 8, at 220. In FTC v. H.N. Singer, one sales manager
was held liable for the total value of all sales made while he was manager, totaling approxi-
mately $290,000. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,011, at
70,619 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
23 Even the threat of joint and several liability may provide a significant deterrent only
if the potential wrongdoers are risk averse. See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution
Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 331, 364-65
(1980) (a no contribution rule between joint antitrust tortfeasors provides additional deter-
rence only if tortfeasors are risk averse).
234 The Commission might avoid reliance and injury issues entirely by changing its the-
ory of recovery to disgorgement of profits. The Securities and Exchange Commission suc-
cessfully recovers profits from securities frauds, not to compensate private injured investors,
but to deter future violations by removing the profit from fraudulent schemes. See Ells-
worth, supra note 212, at 642-52; Farrand, supra note 212, at 1800-05; Hazen, Administra-
tive Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of In-
junctions and Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 446-50 (1979); Jacobs,
Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of Rule 10b-5, 53
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 397, 413-18 (1979); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement
Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1194-96 (1975). Since the purpose is to deny profits, proof
of actual consumer reliance and injury is irrelevant. Congress authorized the Commission to
deter violations as well as compensate individuals. Thus, under the broad authority of sec-
tion 13(b), the Commission would be able to pursue this theory of recovery.
The disadvantage to a disgorgement theory is that the judgments may sometimes be
smaller. See Ellsworth, supra note 212, at 649-51; Farrand, supra note 212, at 1803-04. The
standard measure for disgorgement is the benefit received by the wrongdoer. See SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972). This measure may be
smaller when consumers' losses exceed defendants' gains. Also, it has been argued that since
the theory is based on disgorging profits, defendants' expenses and taxes should be de-
ducted. See Ellsworth, supra note 212, at 655-61. Because of this smaller recovery, a dis-
gorgement of profit theory is inferior to the current Commission theory of recovery.
231 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 95, §§ 107-10, at 740-770.
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each customer relied on the misrepresentation and suffered inju-
ries would effectively kill redress actions. The time and expense
would be prohibitive.
Recognizing this very practical problem, the International Di-
amond magistrate ruled that the Commission need only prove:
that the alleged dishonest or fraudulent practices were the type of
misrepresentation on which a reasonably prudent person would
rely, that they were widely disseminated, and that the injured
consumers purchased [the product]. The burden then shifts to
the defendants to prove that the misrepresentations were not re-
lied upon by the consumers . 36
The magistrate recognized that proof of actual reliance on the
part of all consumers would be a difficult task.13 7 In contrast, the
Furman court seemed to require proof of actual reliance and in-
jury. The court ruled that, because the loss was small ($36.95 per
hair analysis), it would "not be worth a feather" to try to identify
injured customers and make refunds.23 s In doing so, the court com-
pletely ignored the deterrent purpose of redress judgments. Conse-
quently, the International Diamond standard for reliance and in-
jury should become the appropriate standard for non-rule violation
cases. 39 Since section 19 expressly authorizes redress awards for
any rule violation, no additional proof should be required for re-
dress awards in these cases.
The International Diamond magistrate also ruled that the
Commission had to prove that each defendant acted either with
actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation or with reck-
less disregard for the truth. The magistrate relied on the dishonest
and fraudulent standard in section 19 as a guide for the requisite
intent for granting redress under section 13(b).-40 The court, rely-
ing on a prior section 19 redress case, FTC v. Turner,241 imposed
the mail fraud standard of actual knowledge or reckless indiffer-
ence or conscious avoidance of the truth.242 The district court in
216 FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,709
(N.D. Cal. 1983). The Kitco court followed the International Diamond magistrate on this
issue. See FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (D. Minn. 1985).
2317 See International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,725, at 69,709.
218 FTC v. Furman, No. 84-0803-A slip op. (E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 1985).
219 It has been followed in at least one other case. See Kitco, 612 F. Supp. at 1292.
240 International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,725, at 69,706-08.
241 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,244 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
242 International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,725, at 69,707.
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FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc. subsequently adopted the Interna-
tional Diamond actual knowledge or reckless indifference
standard.243
Subjective knowledge or reckless indifference, however, is an
unnecessarily high standard. The International Diamond magis-
trate correctly looked to section 19 for guidance. It contains the
only standard in the FTC Act for awarding consumer redress.
However, section 19 contains only an objective "reasonable person"
standard for non-rule violation cases, not the mail fraud, knowl-
edge or reckless indifference standard.2 44 The Turner case, cited by
the International Diamond magistrate, applied an objective stan-
dard. While the Turner court referred to the mail fraud statute for
guidance in determining which acts fit within "fraudulent or dis-
honest,"245 it did not refer to the mail fraud statute in discussing
the intent requirement. The Turner court ordered redress because
a reasonable person would have known the practices in the case
were fraudulent or dishonest, not because the defendant in Turner
actually knew. 46
In addition to the express language of section 19, the legisla-
tive history supports the Turner court's interpretation. Congress
rejected Senators Magnuson's and Moss's 1971 proposal to permit
redress for any unfair or deceptive practice. Congress wanted some
level of culpability, but chose an objective standard. The confer-
ence report on the final bill refers to the reasonable person stan-
dard for imposing liability, not to knowledge or recklessness.
247
The report also states that the Commission should recover for less
than criminal conduct.24 8 Again, the International Diamond mag-
istrate should not have imposed such a high level of intent. Some
recovery should be permitted for misrepresentations in non-rule
violation cases that meet section 19's objective, reasonable person
standard.
243 612 F. Supp. at 1292 (D. Minn. 1985).
24 The International Diamond magistrate noted that section 19 contains a reasonable
person standard but nevertheless imposed the actual knowledge standard. International Di-
amond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,725, at 69,706.
241 FTC v. Turner, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,244, at 69,450-51 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
Even here, the Turner court indicated that the mail fraud meaning of fraudulent and dis-
honest was narrower than the section 19 meaning. Id. at 69,451.
248 Id.
211 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974).
248 Id.
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b. The Proper Proof for Subordinates
The International Diamond court may have imposed a higher
intent requirement because it chose the higher measure of recovery
usually reserved in equity for intentional misrepresentation. 249 The
high level of proof should not pose a difficult problem for the Com-
mission in its cases against owners and operators of defendant
companies. For example, in International Diamond, the four indi-
vidual defendants allegedly were involved in the management of
the company.260
This high intent burden, however, may pose problems in ac-
tions against subordinates, such as salespersons who had no direct
knowledge of the bases for claims but made representations which
a reasonable person would know, under the circumstances, to be
fraudulent or dishonest. Fraudulent operators are dependent on
sales personnel who will not question the truthfulness of represen-
tations. Many salespersons believe that as long as they say only
what they are told to say by superiors, no matter how outrageous
or improbable, they can escape liability because they relied on
their superior. It would be easier to find more salespersons liable
under a reasonable person standard than the International Dia-
mond standard. If liability can reach such salespersons, the pool of
salespersons willing to look the other way may dry up. Imposing
liability on subordinates, particularly middle level management,
could limit what is known as the "Hydra" effect. The owner opera-
tor is sued and shut down, and each middle level manager opens
his or her own office so the problem is the same or worse. There is
no countervailing reason not to impose at least some redress liabil-
ity based on an objective standard. Section 19 contains a reasona-
ble person standard which would aid the Commission in deterring
violations.
The International Diamond measure of recovery, though, may
not be appropriate. Generally, equity awards no greater recovery
for misrepresentations that fall short of intentional fraud than for
innocent misrepresentations. 251 The Restatement of Restitution
provides some authority for a higher recovery for some negligent
219 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
220 FTC v. International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,506, at 68,458
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
221 D. DOBBS, supra note 126, § 9.4, at 630-31. See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note
95, § 3.19, at 347-53 (discussion of innocent misrepresentation).
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misrepresentations. The Restatement, by an express caveat, took
no position on whether the recipient of the benefit should be liable
for more than the benefit received "where his conduct was not tor-
tious but, because he was negligent . .. , he was more at fault
than the claimant. '252 The Restatement's introductory note to the
section says that the measure of recovery is determined by "the
tortiousness of the defendant's conduct or the negligence or other
fault of one or both of the parties. 2 53 It goes on to state that if the
defendant's conduct was "tortious," he must compensate the
claimant for his loss even if greater than the benefit received. If
the defendant's conduct was "consciously tortious," he is liable for
profits derived from subsequent dealings in the property, even if
they are in excess of the claimant's loss. The note also states that
in other situations the overriding principle is that recovery should
be "granted to the extent and only to the extent that justice be-
tween the parties requires. 2 54 The Restatement seems to distin-
guish between negligent, tortious, and consciously tortious con-
duct. The consciously tortious standard corresponds to the
International Diamond knowledge or reckless indifference stan-
dard. The section 19 reasonable person standards could fit within
the Restatement's "tortious" conduct category whereby defendants
would be liable for consumers' losses, even in excess of the defend-
ants' gains; or within the negligence category of the caveat, for
which the Restatement takes no position.
The imposition of joint and several liability for the total recov-
ery on salespersons who have no authority to control any part of
the operation and who have no actual knowledge of the bases for
representations made illustrates the difficult case in which the Re-
statement does not take a position. In terms of overall deterrence,
the higher liability would improve the Commission's ability to dry
up the sales forces of these organizations. The higher standard,
however, may actually encourage subordinates to open their own
fraudulent operations. 255 The expected liability would not increase
if the subordinate opened his own operation, but the expected gain
would increase substantially. Thus, equal penalty for subordinates
may actually encourage the Hydra effect described earlier. To pre-
252 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 155, at 612 (1937) (caveat to subsection (1)).
253 Id. at 596, introductory note to §§ 150-59.
254 Id.
211 See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 222, at 208. See also
Becker, supra note 222, at 189-90.
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vent this perverse incentive to subordinates, the measure of recov-
ery should be lowered. Subordinates who meet the section 19 rea-
sonable person standard should be liable for consumer losses
attributable to their activity up to the benefit they personally re-
ceived. This measure follows the innocent misrepresentation prin-
ciples of limiting the maximum recovery to the benefit the wrong-
doer received. 56 While this still would be a substantial liability, it
would distinguish between such subordinates and the fraudulent
actors or the owners and operators of schemes.
C. The Need for Greater Penalties
The proposed standards should give the maximum deterrence
possible under the current statutory structure. To provide more ef-
fective deterrence, Congress should authorize awards of civil penal-
ties, in addition to redress judgments, against those persons who
act knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. The small
likelihood of punishment dictates that the severity of the punish-
ment be high in order to create an effective deterrent.257 Civil pen-
alties would provide this higher penalty. Section 5(m) already au-
thorizes civil penalties for willful rule violations. Knowing or
reckless deception warrants the same high deterrence.
Civil penalties would also increase the Commission's ability to
collect the judgments. The deterrent effect of any penalty is de-
pendent on the assumption that the wrongdoer will actually have
to pay the penalty or judgment.258 A number of defendants in sev-
eral cases have filed for bankruptcy to avoid paying redress judg-
ments.259 The Commission, in these cases, stands as a general cred-
itor in bankruptcy and can collect only a small portion of the
redress judgment. To collect any more, the Commission must con-
vince the bankruptcy court not to grant the debtor a discharge.260
256 See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 95, § 3.19, at 348-49.
257 R. POSNER, ECONosMc ANALYSIS, supra note 222, at 207-08; Becker, supra note 222,
at 185-90.
2'S R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 222, at 209.
219 See supra note 11.
260 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 727(a) (1982).
The disgorgement of profits theory, see supra note 234, may put the Commission in a
better position as a claimant in bankruptcy. Under restitution theory, defendants in bank-
ruptcy can argue that the injured consumers, not the Commission, are the actual claimants
and that the Commission's claim should be disallowed. Cf. In re Cannon, 31 Bankr. 823
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (state lacked status as creditor). But see Nathanson v. NLRB, 344
U.S. 25, 26-87 (1952) (NLRB is a creditor). The Commission should have a better claim
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Civil penalties are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 6" Bankruptcy
would be a less attractive haven and the deterrent effect would be
greatly increased because the Commission could levy on post-
bankruptcy assets.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 13(b) gives the Commission a new enforcement tool
that potentially may be very effective in stopping fraud quickly
and in securing redress for consumers. The scope of this new au-
thority should be formally narrowed to those cases well adapted to
judicial action. Such narrowing is necessary to avoid judicial action
in cases where the complained of activity, although apparently un-
fair or deceptive, is actually the proper result of a well-functioning,
competitive market. Such narrowing is also necessary to protect
the Commission's position as the sole interpreter of the meaning of
section 5 unfairness and deception. Congress wants the Commis-
sion to continue to develop standards for fair and honest business
practices. In order to preserve this role, judicial interpretations
that might limit Commission flexibility should be kept to a mini-
mum. This Article proposes that an effective definition for proper
cases would be a rule violation, violation of a statute enforced by
the Commission other than the FTC Act, or a misrepresentation of
material fact. It is narrow enough to exclude close cases and broad
enough to include cases within judicial competence.
Once a proper case is established, the proper proof for relief
must be defined. Deterrence should be the primary goal of these
actions. For maximum deterrence, the principles announced in the
International Diamond opinions, combined with a lesser, reasona-
ble person standard for subordinates, offers the best alternative for
non-rule violation cases. Section 19 expressly authorizes redress for
any rule violation. For a truly effective deterrent, though, the Com-
mission needs additional authority to seek civil penalties in egre-
gious cases.
Section 13(b) actions have the potential to be an important
tool in the fight against egregious consumer frauds. If developed
under a disgorgement theory because its claim would be purely in the public interest, not
based on individual consumers' injuries. See supra note 228.
261 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
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properly, this one-line proviso from the 1970's reforms of the Com-
mission could become the single greatest addition to consumer pro-
tection law.
